Fundamentals of Arabic cryptology and covert communication networks by Miles, Adam
Santa Clara University
Scholar Commons
Applied Mathematics Masters Theses Student Scholarship
7-13-2012
Fundamentals of Arabic cryptology and covert
communication networks
Adam Miles
Santa Clara University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/amth_mstr
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Applied
Mathematics Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Miles, Adam, "Fundamentals of Arabic cryptology and covert communication networks" (2012). Applied Mathematics Masters Theses.
Paper 1.

Fundamentals of Arabic Cryptology and 
Covert Communication Networks
ﺃﺳﺎﺳﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻔﻴﺮ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ ﻭ ﺷﺒﻜﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺴﺮﻳﺔ
by
Adam Miles
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of 
Master of Science in Applied Mathematics
School of Engineering
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, California
July 13, 2012
Dedication
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my family and friends, who have always 
supported my professional endeavors.  Specifically, I would like to recognize my friend 
Saad and his family in Rabat, Morocco, who took me into their home and who taught me 
a great deal about Arab Muslim culture and the Moroccan Arabic dialect.
iii
Acknowledgments
First, I would like to acknowledge Stephen A. Chiappari, Ph.D., who has provided 
me with support and encouragement as an advisor and department chair.  In particular, I 
appreciate his guidance in helping me accurately define mathematical and computer 
programming concepts related to covert networks.  I would also like to acknowledge 
Ahmed F. Yassin, Ph.D., who served as my Spoken Iraqi Dialect instructor at Georgetown 
University and who helped verify the Modern Standard Arabic grammar, spelling, and 
translation.  I would also like to thank my good friend and fellow graduate computer 
engineer Nick Treat, M.S., for his assistance in running the steganography computer 
programs and for evaluating the correctness of the output.  Finally, I would like to thank 
my sister Jessica Miles, M.S., for her assistance in editing and formatting the final 
document.
iv
vFundamentals of Arabic Cryptology and 
Covert Communication Networks
ﺃﺳﺎﺳﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻔﻴﺮ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ ﻭ ﺷﺒﻜﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺴﺮﻳﺔ
Adam Miles
Department of Applied Mathematics
Santa Clara University
July 13, 2012
ABSTRACT
The need for accurate intelligence concerning possible terrorist attacks, spies, and 
other hostile military type actions, whether it be at home or abroad, remains of critical 
importance to the U.S. Intelligence Community.  In this context, this paper focuses 
directly on the foundational aspects of covert communication networks and how they 
may be formed by groups or organizations such as al-Qaeda, jihadists, insurgents, etc. 
using spy tradecraft, cryptography and the language of Modern Standard Arabic.  
The paper itself is divided into two parts, one that focuses upon communicating 
covertly through methods without the use of electronics, and the other with electronics.  
The reason for this division is to highlight the fact that a group of individuals or an 
organization may purposefully choose to use one style of covert communication over the 
other in order to achieve a particular objective.  For instance, electronic surveillance may 
be a concern.  The examples that will be given in each part are centered around
theoretical covert network operations conducted in the countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.  Accompanying these examples, a useful system for 
network organization is presented in order to help the reader, in this case U.S. intelligence 
officials, to analyze the flow of covert communications in general.  Not only does this 
system demonstrate the differences between electronic and non-electronic networks, but 
it also shows that with proper planning and training, the groups formerly mentioned could 
possibly create intensely abstract and complicated networks in order to adapt to certain 
battlefield conditions.  With this said, it is the author’s suggestion to the reader to think 
‘outside of the box’ when approaching the paper and to know that everything may not 
always be as it appears.
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Disclaimer
The examples provided in this thesis are entirely fictitious and do not contain real 
people, events, or cities.  This thesis also does not encourage the formation of covert 
network ideas or elements or conducting Arabic cryptography/steganography.  However, 
to maintain the life-like quality of the examples, the situations depicted will take place in 
the countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.  This is more of an 
attempt by the author to stay true to the terrain, infrastructure, languages, and cultures 
that are exhibited in these countries.  These five countries have been chosen since they 
are at the top of the U.S. government’s list of countries that have played a key role in the 
War on Terrorism and the war in Iraq.  Most importantly, the author would like to express 
his support to the U.S. government and other countries in their endeavors to fight 
terrorism by showing how terrorists could possibly create covert networks in an effort to 
deceive their enemies.
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1Introduction
Effective intelligence depends heavily upon the study of how people interact with 
one another and how well one can predict future events resulting from those interactions.  
Of course, every interaction requires some degree of communication, whether it be in the 
form of a phone call, courier system, email, cryptography, or just plain silence in order to 
achieve a certain goal.  In the context of intelligence, the purpose of this paper is to 
provide a general system for the analysis and categorization of covert communication 
networks by presenting the reader with the basic concepts of graph theory, simple 
algorithms or procedures for cryptography and steganography, and hypothetical scenarios 
of people attempting to communicate secretly in real time.  All concepts and examples 
presented in this paper are meant to be seen through the eyes of United States (U.S.) 
intelligence officials, and for this reason, a few sections regarding cryptanalysis are 
included.  
The examples presented in the first part of this paper demonstrate fictional covert 
non-electronic cross-border operations conducted by groups such as the Taliban, al-
Qaeda, etc. between the countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  That is, communication 
does not rely upon electronic devices such as cell-phones, walkie-talkies, and computers.  
In contrast, the second part presents examples of long distance covert electronic networks 
created by al-Qaeda and other militants in the countries of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. 
All examples incorporate cultural and geographical attributes pertaining to these selected 
countries and/or the language of Modern Standard Arabic.
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Part I
Covert Non-Electronic Networks and Arabic Cryptology Applications
The Pentagon’s creation of an ultra-secret surveillance organization 
known as the Intelligence Support Activity or, more simply, ‘The 
Activity’… [and] its pursuit of enemy big fish failed repeatedly in 
Somalia, Bosnia, and the pursuit of bin Laden as the targets learned to 
avoid using vulnerable cellphones, relying on human couriers instead. 
(Geraghty, 2010, pp. 52 & 66-67)
Imagine that an American spy is living in Iran and that he or she has been tasked 
with the assignment to gather intelligence on Iran’s nuclear and/or long-range missile 
research and development programs.  Furthermore, suppose that the American spy is 
posing as a Swiss banker - since he or she is in deep cover and the Swiss are neutral - and 
that he or she has been given a list of the names of some Iranians who are known to have 
ties to these programs.  The spy has also been told that these Iranians are not particularly 
fond of the Iranian regime and that they might be willing to give out information for a 
price or for a chance to leave Iran with their families.  Bottom line is, the spy knows that 
he or she wants to contact these individuals, but he or she also knows that doing so is 
extremely dangerous.  That is, the American spy knows that the Iranian regime is intent 
on finding traitors or Western spies by monitoring electronic communications and 
through intimidation from the secret police.  Some of the questions the spy might ask are:  
How is he or she going to make contact with these people without getting caught?  What 
are some of the different ways the spy can try to maneuver around the barrier of being 
23
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electronically monitored to gain the right information?  What are some of the specific 
steps the spy can take to safeguard his or her communications, and possibly his or her 
life?  All of these questions relate to the field of spy tradecraft, which includes the 
fundamental operative techniques used by spies to conduct successful intelligence 
operations (International Spy Museum, 2011).
In the context of spy tradecraft, this part will describe a variety of ways in which 
two or more people can secretly communicate with one another without using electronic 
devices such as cell phones, computers, two-way radios, etc.  These covert non-
electronic communication methods can include the use of couriers or messengers, 
specific courier routes and destinations, drivers, dead drops, cryptography, and 
steganography, to name a few.  (Note that the word covert in this instance denotes an 
activity that is “secret” to the controllers of communication, but in fact may be exposed to 
outsiders.)  These communication tactics can also rely entirely upon human physical 
encounters or they can depend upon a combination of both physical encounters and 
written cryptographic schemes.  When covert non-electronic communication methods are 
systematically combined together, they ultimately form covert non-electronic networks 
(CNN) or covert non-electronic networks combined with cryptography (CNN(C)).  
The main advantage of such clandestine networks is that any information exchanged 
between participating parties is not subject to electronic interception as a result of poorly 
secured transmissions or open electronic channels.  One may also benefit strategically by 
adopting these primitive types of networks when access to modern or sophisticated 
technology is limited or nonexistent.  However, these communication networks are not 
34
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without flaw.  For one thing, they can be slow - and in a world of spies where network 
speed might be the least of one’s worries, they can be infiltrated or observed by outsiders, 
corrupted by insiders, and potentially deadly for the players of the game.
We include some examples that demonstrate how one’s enemies, such as al-
Qaeda, the Taliban, jihadists, and insurgents, could possibly construct CNN and CNN(C) 
in an attempt to adapt to certain battlefield conditions.  These battlefield conditions 
primarily involve, but are not limited to, these groups’ inability to access or afford 
advanced technology, in addition to these groups’ awareness of U.S. military prowess 
concerning electronic surveillance.  These chapters will also present how covert non-
electronic methods can be manipulated, expanded, and creatively altered by other factors 
(e.g., multiple couriers or cryptosystems) to perform an objective that is specific to the 
particular covert network at hand.  In the future, it is these structural modifications that 
will be of interest when categorizing more complicated CNN/CNN(C), performing 
network analysis, and/or conducting cryptanalysis.  Going from the chapter of CNN to 
CNN(C), it will be shown why these particular groups would want to fundamentally 
modify or upgrade CNN with cryptography in order to make it harder for authorities to 
gain timely and significant intelligence.  
It is important to mention at this point that intelligence officials may still have the 
opportunity to observe or intercept non-electronic enemy communications.  For instance, 
officials may use wiretapping or eavesdropping, Predator drones, and/or on-the-ground 
human intelligence, to collect vital information from relevant non-electronic sources.  
However, these types of networks may also impose hardships on those conducting 
45
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surveillance.  For example, authorities observing such networks generally must be in 
closer proximity to the communications, thereby increasing costs, hazards, and 
manpower, associated with surveillance.  The use of these types of communications by an 
enemy also reduces the number of ways intelligence personnel may gather information 
across vulnerable and easy-access places like the Internet.
56
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Chapter 1: Covert Non-Electronic Networks (CNN)
What we’re dealing with here is potentially a global conflagration that 
requires constant diligence in order to suppress.  Now you see because 
our enemy has realized that they are fighting guys from the future.  
Now, it is brilliant as it is infuriating.  If you live like it’s the past, and 
you behave like it’s the past, then guys from the future find it very 
hard to see you.  If you throw away your cell phone, shut down your e-
mail, pass all your instructions face-to-face, hand-to-hand, turn your 
back on technology, [you can] just disappear into the crowd.  So what 
[has] changed is that our allegedly unsophisticated enemy, has cotten 
[sic] on to the factually unsophisticated truth, we’re an easy target. 
(Scott, 2008)
1.1 Basic graph theory.
According to Chen (1997) in basic graph theory, an undirected graph or network 
Gu(V, Eu), is formed by combining a set of elements V, called nodes, with a set of 
elements Eu in V, called undirected edges.  The term graph is synonymous with network.  
Visually, a node is represented by a point or junction, while an undirected edge is 
represented by a simple undirected line or branch (a line without an arrow).  In practice, 
the nodes i and j are usually connected by an undirected edge (i, j) or (j, i); here, nodes i 
and j are called the endpoints of the undirected edge (i, j) or (j, i).  Moreover, the 
undirected edge, (i, j), is an unordered pair and it is often denoted by a letter such as e.  
Note an edge may be represented by a straight line or a curved line.  This option may or 
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may not hold meaning to network diagramming and must be considered by the analyst of 
the network.
Figure 1. Two nodes with an undirected edge.
i j
e
Similarly, a directed graph or network Gd(V, Ed), is formed by combining a set of 
elements V, called nodes, with a set of elements Ed in V, called directed edges.  Visually, 
the nodes i and j are usually connected by a directed line (a line with an arrow) or 
directed edge (i, j); here, the node i is called the initial node and the node j is called the 
terminal node.  Again, the nodes i and j are called the endpoints of the directed edge (i, j).  
Moreover, the directed edge, (i, j), is an ordered pair and it is often denoted by a letter 
such as e.  This edge may also be represented by a straight or curved line.
Figure 2. Two nodes with a directed edge.
i j
e
Finally, a mixed graph or network Gm(V, Em) contains both undirected and 
directed edges.  Some examples of these three different types of networks are presented 
below.
78
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Figure 3. An undirected network.
i
j
e1
k
e2
Figure 4. A directed network.
i
j
e1
k
e3
l
e2
Figure 5. A mixed network.
i
j
e1
k
e2
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1.2 Covert networks and data fields.
In this paper, we define a covert network as an undirected network Gu(V, Eu), or 
more simply, G(V, E).  For simplicity, we define nodes as physical locations and edges as 
“connections” between locations.  For example, the locations of a house and a post-office 
in a particular city may be considered nodes.  If a person living in that house receives a 
letter from the post-office, then there is a “connection” between the two nodes.  We also 
say that each node contains zero or more data fields, which uniquely determine the 
properties of the node.  Examples of data fields include: addresses, telephone numbers, 
persons of interest, descriptions of connections to other nodes, other data fields, etc.  
These data fields will be helpful in terms of network organization and analysis since they 
can be easily managed and written in the form of code with a computer language such as 
C.  This code could then be used for the development of a computer program and/or 
graphical interface.  For instance in a hypothetical graphical interface setting, clicking the 
mouse on a particular node would reveal the data fields for edit.  Newly edited node data 
could then be synthesized with other node data via another computer program to produce 
network data.  It might also be possible to integrate the use of directed edges to show 
network flow for a particular data set such as money.  To save time we have not included 
code, a graphical interface, or a computer program for this paper, but instead we provide 
the basic framework for general covert network organization and analysis.
A particular data field may encompass other data fields.  For example, the data 
field of address includes the data fields of street location, zip code, country, etc.  With this 
said, we say that the data field of spy tradecraft includes the data fields of: type of 
910
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espionage (e.g., military, corporate, etc.), covert communication methods, location (e.g., 
domestic or overseas), time period, etc.  Of course, these spy tradecraft data fields contain 
other data fields.  The data fields located under the data field of covert communication 
methods are the primary focus of this paper.  Although we state these data fields 
explicitly, the node data fields of an efficient computer program and/or graphical 
interface should not be set in stone, and therefore should be left open to customization by 
the software developers, analysts, and computer programmers. 
10
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Figure 6. The data field of spy tradecraft.
• Spy tradecraft
• Type of espionage
• Military
• Intelligence service
• Corporate
• Covert communication methods
• Covert non-electronic communication
• Addresses or locations of interest, descriptions
• Persons of interest, couriers and contacts (time and 
place of contact, profiles, courier routes, etc.)
• Drops (dead, live, timed), brush pass
• Connections to other locations
• Steganography (non-electronic)
• Cryptography (non-electronic)
• Cryptosystems
• Keys
• Ciphtertexts
• Plaintexts
• Objects/items (may be hidden or used to hide other 
objects/messages)
• Written messages, verbal messages
• Covert electronic communication
• Addresses or locations of interest, descriptions
• Electronic couriers and contacts (time and place of 
contact, profiles, electronic routes, etc.)
• Electronic drops (dead, live, timed)
• Connections to other locations
• Steganography (electronic)
• Cryptography (includes cryptosystems, keys, 
ciphertexts, plaintexts)
• General files (e.g., Microsoft Word or Excel)
• Picture/image files, audio files
• Messages (email, text message, verbal, etc.)
• The Internet, websites
• Hardware (computers, two-way radios, etc.)
• Hybrid communication (combination of non-electronic and 
electronic communication)
• Location
• Time period
11
12
13
1.3 Covert non-electronic communication methods.
Some descriptions of covert non-electronic communication methods and how they 
relate to the field of spy tradecraft are provided below.
A contact is a clandestine meeting between two parties or more at a particular 
location.  A covert non-electronic network can contain multiple contacts.  According to 
the International Spy Museum (2011), a cut-out is a situation in which two parties agree 
to exchange information by using a specific depository or a third party contact/
intermediary, under the condition that the two parties do not meet directly during the 
transaction.  Examples of cut-outs include various types of drops as well as brush passes.  
A dead drop is a secret depository or physical location where two parties agree to 
exchange information (International Spy Museum, 2011).  Both parties can choose to 
interact with the dead drop site directly or they can choose to send couriers.  It is also 
possible to have multiple dead drop sites and couriers in order to relay a message.  A live 
drop is similar to a dead drop in the sense that instead of a secret depository an actual 
person, such as a third party/intermediary, knowingly or unknowingly passes information 
between two parties (Spytrainer, 2009).  According to Antonio and Jonna Mendez (2002), 
former C.I.A. operatives, a timed drop is a dead drop with a set time limit, in which the 
deposited information must be retrieved before the time limit expires.  Finally, a brush 
pass is a timed and coordinated maneuver between two parties, in which one party 
quickly and subtly hands a message to the second party in an attempt to project a 
nonexistent relationship to outside observers; this maneuver is usually conducted in a 
crowd or public space (Spytrainer, 2009).
12
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A courier or messenger is a trusted individual who is given a written message 
and delivery instructions by one party, and is expected to follow through by delivering 
the message to a second party or specified location.  A covert non-electronic network can 
consist of multiple couriers, destinations, and vested parties.  Remember, couriers can be 
identified and followed by outsiders, rebel against their handlers, or be an intelligence 
service in disguise.
According to Cole (2003), steganography is “on the simplest level...hidden 
writing, whether it consists of invisible ink on paper or copyright information hidden in 
an audio file” (p. 5).  We have decided to take Cole’s definition of steganography and 
divide it into two subcategories, non-electronic and electronic.  Non-electronic 
steganography is the non-electronic component of steganography, in which writing or 
information is hidden in a physical setting, such as a tattoo that can only be seen under 
black-light or a message hidden in an elaborate drawing (Cole, 2003).  Non-electronic 
steganography may also involve transporting an item, which may seem trivial or 
meaningless to an interceptor but in fact has a predetermined meaning to the receiver.  
Conversely, electronic steganography is the electronic component of steganography, in 
which writing or information is hidden electronically or digitally in image files, audio 
files, word documents, and other types of mediums (Cole, 2003).  Only non-electronic 
steganography is allowed in the definition of CNN.  A hybrid type of network involving 
CNN and electronics, such as the physical transport of electronic and digitial 
steganography on a USB flash drive, is a topic for further study and classification.  The 
data field of cryptography will be discussed in the next chapter.
13
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1.4 Examples of CNN.
Courier: The messenger boy.
Afghanistan - Suppose that Karim and his friends are renting an inexpensive 
farmhouse for their summer vacation on the outskirts of a small mountain town called 
Henna near the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.  
For now, Karim tells his friends that he would like to send a secret written 
message to his cousin Sami, who he says lives in a small village in Pakistan just a few 
miles from the border.  Because the farmhouse has no internet or land-line telephone, and 
none of them has brought a cell phone, computer, or two-radio, communication will be 
difficult, but not impossible.  To overcome this problem, Karim suggests to his friends 
that they pay a young boy in town who knows the area well to deliver the written 
message.  Karim also says that they must instruct the boy not to tell anyone about the 
message and not to reveal where the message came from if he is caught.  Karim’s friends 
add that they could use the same boy for all future messages, or that they could find new 
and different couriers for each message; and if worse comes to worst, one of them could 
deliver the message.
14
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Figure 7. The messenger boy network.
Courier: The hotel manager.
Pakistan - Meanwhile just across the border, Karim’s cousin Sami is busily 
preparing to receive and host a few out-of-town business associates at his family-owned 
hotel called the Fahkir Hotel.  Before his business associates arrive, Sami asks his 
brother-in-law and hotel manager Abdul, to deliver a secret package to his cousin Karim, 
who he says is vacationing in a farmhouse not too far from the Hotel.  Sami knows that 
by sending the package on foot, he does not risk the chance of the package’s information 
loc1
loc2
Location 1 Data Fields
• Location (Country - Afghanistan, 
town - Henna, description - near 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border, 
place - farmhouse)
• Persons of interest (Karim and 
friends, messenger boy)
• Covert non-electronic 
communication methods 
(description - no electronics 
available, messenger or courier - 
messenger boy with written 
message is sent to Karim’s cousin 
Sami)
Location 2 Data Fields
• Location (Country - Pakistan, 
town/place - a small town in 
Pakistan, description - near 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border)
• Persons of interest (Karim’s 
cousin Sami)
• Covert non-electronic 
communication methods (receiver 
of Karim’s message from 
messenger boy)
15
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being electronically intercepted.  Sami also assumes that the chance of the package being 
physically intercepted is very low.  Abdul, who is very trustworthy, quickly agrees to take 
the assignment because he will get a few days off from work.  
Note on couriers:  These two scenarios illustrate that couriers can be random strangers, 
friends, family members and/or business associates.  They also show that in a covert non-
electronic network, a particular courier can be used more than once, or that there can be a 
system of multiple couriers in place.  In addition, these examples also demonstrate that 
the secrecy of the message depends upon the trustworthiness of the courier.  This can be 
problematic for both sender and receiver.
Contact: Downtown Henna.
Afghanistan - Karim’s friends are leisurely sitting around the farmhouse one 
afternoon when Karim enters.  Karim tells his friends that he is going to visit a man 
named Farooq in downtown Henna for the day to discuss some business affairs which 
might be of interest to them.  When he returns, Karim says that they should all have a 
meeting to go over Farooq’s information.
Contact: The doorman.
Pakistan - The well-known doorman of the Fahkir Hotel, Mohammed, has just 
finished unloading the luggage of some new guests, when his boss Sami approaches him 
and pulls him aside.  Sami asks Mohammed if he would take the afternoon off to go into 
the city of Dora (which is about five minutes away) to have a secret exchange of words 
with his friend Maria.  Sami tells Mohammed that he is to return immediately once the 
conversation has ended so that he can hear about the meeting’s details.  He also tells 
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Mohammed that once they have finished their conversation, he should go back into Dora 
to a place nicknamed the Stonehouse to deliver Maria’s information to a woman named 
Fatima. 
Dead drop: The purple plant.
Afghanistan - While sitting on the porch of the farmhouse, Karim asks his friends 
if anyone has heard of a man named Alim, and if so, how does one go about contacting 
him.  Karim’s friend, Basil, says that he has heard of this man and that he knows how to 
contact him.  Basil tells Karim that he should go into the town of Henna to a place called 
the Rikshire café.  Here, Basil instructs Karim, he must place his message in an envelope 
underneath the soil of a fake purple plant located in the back of the café near some tables.  
Basil says that Alim checks the pot for new envelopes every couple of days.  Basil also 
adds that if Alim is told to respond to the message, Alim will place a similar looking 
envelope beneath the actual pot of the same plant in exactly three days.
Live drop: The suitcase.
Pakistan - One day Sami decides that he wants to reconnect with a man named 
Hanif and his associates.  From past experience, Sami knows that he must place his 
message inside a suitcase full of clothes and bring it to a hotel called the Imad.  There, 
Sami must pretend to be a guest checking out of the Hotel and he must ask the valet to 
hold onto his bag for his cousin to pick up in a few hours.  Sami also knows that he must 
place two blue luggage tags on the suitcase so that one of Hanif’s men can recognize it 
when scouting out new deliveries.  The valet does not know that he is passing 
information along to Hanif.
17
18
19
Timed drop: The cave.
Afghanistan - Before going to bed one night, Karim orders Basil to wake up early 
the following morning to deliver a small package.  Furthermore, he instructs Basil to grab 
the map on the kitchen table and to use it to hike up to a particular cave in the nearby 
mountains.  Karim says the ‘red x’ on the map signifies the cave’s location.  Once he has 
arrived at the cave, Basil should place the small package underneath some loose rocks 
just outside the cave’s entrance.  Karim also tells Basil that he must return to the cave at 
noon to see if the package has been taken.  In the event that it’s still there, he should bring 
it back to the farmhouse.
Brush pass: The man in the black thawb.
Pakistan - Standing in the lobby of the Hotel, Sami calls for his doorman 
Mohammed to come in.  Sami gives a letter to Mohammed and tells him that he must 
discreetly pass the letter over to a man wearing a black thawb (a black robe) in the suuq 
(market) downtown.  Sami emphasizes to Mohammed that he cannot stop walking when 
he enters the suuq, and that the man will approach from the East in front of the Jala 
Patisserie at precisely three o’clock.  Failure to do so in an inconspicuous manner, Sami 
adds, could be potentially dangerous.
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Chapter 2: Covert Non-Electronic Networks Combined with Cryptography 
[CNN(C)]
The Vietnamese – contrary to the peasant image projected by some 
Western journalists – often proved themselves superior to the U.S. 
even on the arcane battlefield of electronic warfare.  “The Vietcong 
cryptographers learned their lessons well.  While throwing an 
electronic fishing net into the ether, they regularly reeled it back in 
bulging with American communications, but they seldom used radios 
themselves.  While they listened to broadcasts from Hanoi on 
inexpensive transistor radios, they sent messages back to their 
commands with couriers, except in dire emergencies.” (Geraghty, 
2010, p. 3)
Unlike ordinary CNN, Covert Non-Electronic Networks combined with 
Cryptography (CNN(C)) look to the field of cryptography to cleverly disguise all 
communications.  For example, an organization might choose to encrypt the text of a 
written message by using a designated cryptosystem and key before he or she gives it to a 
courier.  As for the cryptosystems involved, an organization could choose from a variety 
of classical cryptosystems such as a shift cipher, affine cipher, or simple Vigenère cipher.  
Although classical cryptosystems are not secure in general, they may be suitable for 
situations in which sensitive information expires quickly and/or persons exposed to the 
ciphertext are not familiar with cryptography.  
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2.1 An example of a CNN(C).
Shift cipher: Blackmail.
The shift cipher is a well-known cryptosystem within the field of cryptography, 
and the following example parallels the same shift cipher technique found in Trappe and 
Washington (2006).  However, this particular shift cipher uses Modern Standard Arabic 
(MSA) as well as the author’s own set of numerical values. 
Afghanistan - Karim and his friends are becoming increasingly paranoid that 
some of the locals they are paying to deliver messages are passing information to outside 
groups for cash rewards.  This came to light when Basil said that one of the locals, who 
was not one of their messengers, approached him and asked him for money for something 
relating to one of their previous letters.  Basil said that it essentially amounted to 
blackmail.  This situation, Karim notes, poses a serious threat to the privacy of their 
communications, as well as to the internal workings of their organization.  To overcome 
this problem, Karim suggests that they start encrypting their messages.  Karim also points 
out that they can continue to employ the locals to deliver messages as long as their 
messages are encrypted.
Karim wishes to send a message to Sami before he becomes overwhelmed with 
hotel reservations during the high season.  Karim’s message will notify Sami that their 
friend Ibrahim has returned to Iraq.  Before Karim gives his message to one of the local 
messengers, he encrypts it using a shift cipher.  (Note that the message will be written 
down on a piece of paper and placed in an envelope.)
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For the shift cipher, Karim labels the letters of the Modern Standard Arabic 
(MSA) alphabet and its special characters or modified letters with the ordered set of 
integers {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 34, 35}, starting with 0 = ﺍ.  Special characters are taken from 
non-voweled MSA script, and we label them with integers as given in Figure 9 below.  
Since the MSA alphabet is read right to left, the integers will also go right to left.  The 
MSA alphabet can be permuted, but for now it will be left in its original form.  
Analogously, the English alphabet can be labeled with the ordered set of integers {0, 1, 2, 
3…, 25}, starting with A = 0.  Adding punctuation to the character set only containing the 
English alphabet, one might label the question mark character ‘ ? ’ as integer 26, thereby 
augmenting the set of considered integers to {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 26}.  For simplicity, MSA 
vowelization and punctuation marks are not considered.  
Figure 8. Modern Standard Arabic alphabet (labeled with integers 0 - 27).
Figure 9. MSA Special characters/modified letters (labeled with integers 28 - 35).
Karim’s message m (or plaintext) to Sami is,
ﻱ
27
ﻭ
26
ﻩ
25
ﻥ
24
ﻡ
23
ﻝ
22
ﻙ
21
ﻕ
20
ﻑ
19
ﻍ
18
ﻉ
17
ﻅ
16
ﻁ
15
ﺽ
14
ﺹ
13
ﺵ
12
ﺱ
11
ﺯ
10
ﺭ
9
ﺫ
8
ﺩ
7
ﺥ
6
ﺡ
5
ﺝ
4
ﺙ
3
ﺕ
2
ﺏ
1
ﺍ
0
ﺅ
35
ﺓ
34
ﻯ
33
ﺉ
32
ﺀ
31
ﺁ
30
ﺇ
29
ﺃ
28
. ﺭﺟﻊ ﺳﻠﻴﻢ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻕ
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message translation: 
Ibrahim returned to Iraq.
For the shift cipher, Karim uses the encryption formula,
f(x) ≡ (x + k) mod 36
where 0 ≤ k ≤ 35.  The integer k is called the key.
Karim selects a secret integer k = 6 as the key, so f(x) ≡ (x + 6) mod 36.
Figure 10. Shift cipher encryption.
Karim’s ciphertext and encrypted message is,
ﻃﺰﻣﻌﺄﻯﺇﺅﺃﺛﺨﺄﻣﻄﺨﻮ
Note:  The encrypted message in connected letter form is ﻃﺰﻣﻌﺄﻯﺇﺅﺃﺛﺨﺄﻣﻄﺨﻮ  ,while the 
same encrypted message in disconnected letter form is ﻁ ﺯ ﻡ ﻉ ﺃ ﻯ ﺇ ﺅ ﺃ ﺙ ﺥ ﺃ ﻡ ﻁ ﺥ ﻭ .  
These versions are identical except that there are spaces between the letters in the 
disconnected form.  Letters with naturally occurring spaces in the connected letter form 
cannot be joined together, since they are not defined in MSA.  These extra spaces, 
whether they occur in the connected or disconnected forms, are ignored for simplicity 
ﻯ
33
3
ﺙ
ﻝ
22
28
ﺃ
ﺇ
29
35
ﺅ
ﻡ
23
29
ﺇ
ﻱ
27
33
ﻯ
ﻕ
20
26
ﻭ
ﻝ
22
28
ﺃ
ﺍ
0
6
ﺥ
ﺱ
11
17
ﻉ
ﺭ
9
15
ﻁ
ﻉ
17
23
ﻡ
ﻉ
17
23
ﻡ
ﺝ
4
10
ﺯ
ﻝ
22
28
ﺃ
ﺭ
9
15
ﻁ
ﺍ
0
6
ﺥ
plaintext
x
f(x)
ciphertext
plaintext
x
f(x)
ciphertext
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throughout the paper during both the encryption and decryption processes.  Sentence form 
is identical to the connected and disconnected forms, except that sentence form combines 
correctly ordered letter combinations to form words.  As another example, take the 
plaintext sentence form message above and give all 3 forms. 
sentence form:  ﺭﺟﻊ ﺳﻠﻴﻢ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻕ
connected letter form:  ﺭﺟﻌﺴﻠﻴﻤﺈﻟﻰﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻕ
disconnected letter form:  ﺭ ﺝ ﻉ ﺱ ﻝ ﻱ ﻡ ﺇ ﻝ ﻯ ﺍ ﻝ ﻉ ﺭ ﺍ ﻕ
Of course, ciphertext sentence form is probably meaningless and nonexistent as the above 
example demonstrates (see ﻃﺰﻣﻌﺄﻯﺇﺅﺃﺛﺨﺄﻣﻄﺨﻮ )
Karim puts his message in an envelope and gives it to the messenger.
decryption formula derivation:
f(x) ≡ (x + 6) mod 36
f(x) - 6 ≡ x mod 36
x ≡ (f(x) - 6) mod 36 
2.2 Complete communication for CNN(C).
An important question is, how will Sami know how to decrypt Karim’s message 
m using the formula x ≡ (f(x) - k) mod 36 and the key k = 6?  With this question in mind, 
if Sami later receives only the formula from Karim (delivered perhaps by a different 
courier through a separate message), he will be able to search through all the possible 
keys to obtain Karim’s original message, though this may take a while.  If on the other 
hand, Sami receives both the formula and the key (again delivered by a separate courier), 
then decryption will not be difficult.  And if Sami just receives the key, then he will not 
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know what cryptosystem is being used for the ciphertext, which will make decryption 
somewhat difficult, especially if the ciphertext is short and/or a modern day cryptosystem 
is involved.  This is where the art of ciphertext/cryptosystem sharing and key passing 
techniques comes into play.  The term art is used here because there are an infinite 
number of creative ways in which one can covertly deliver ciphertexts, cryptosystems 
and keys to a receiving party.  The term complete communication in a CNN(C) is used 
to describe a situation, in which all corresponding ciphertext(s), cryptosystem(s) and/or 
key(s) for a given plaintext are delivered on time to their correct destinations, under the 
condition that the delivery of these items to their destinations is synchronized in a way by 
the controllers of the network to allow for the successful decryption of the ciphertext(s). 
For this reason, we divide the data field of cryptography into four new fields: keys, 
plaintexts, ciphertexts, and cryptosystems. 
Ciphertext/cryptosystem passing or sharing is a method in which one delivers 
a ciphertext/cryptosystem to another party through the use of couriers, contacts, cell
phones, computers, etc.  Like ciphertext/cryptosystem sharing, key passing or sharing is 
a method in which one delivers the keys of a ciphertext/cryptosystem to another party 
using one of the methods mentioned above.  For now, we will only focus on ciphertext 
and key passing techniques in a non-electronic setting.  
Ciphertext sharing and key passing are equally important for the receiver, since 
they depend upon one another.  For example, a ciphertext without a key is useless to a 
receiving party, since the ciphertext is meant to be viewed anyway (though this ciphertext 
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might be extremely valuable to an outside observer).  With this said, it is best to keep the 
ciphertext delivery completely separated from the delivery of the key.
2.3 Modern Standard Arabic language statistics.
Frequency analysis.
The following statistical data on the frequencies of the Modern Standard Arabic 
alphabet and its special characters was computed by a Canadian software company called 
Intellaren.  Intellaren (2012) specializes in multilingual software solutions and has 
produced software products such as Intellyze, which is an Arabic letter and word 
frequency analyzer.  
In order to calculate the letter frequencies of MSA, Intellaren (2012) used its 
software to conduct an experiment on four different input sources (see below).  For the 
experiment, their software counted the number of times each character of the MSA 
alphabet and its special characters appeared in each source, while omitting spaces, 
punctuation, and vowelization.  The frequency count data is separated into two 
categories; one category for Source 1 (The Quran  ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺁﻥ ), the second, a combination of 
Sources 2-4.
Four original input sources (Intellaren, 2012).
Source 1: The Quran  ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺁﻥ   (total number of letters: 330,709)
Source 2: The first seven volumes of the series  ﺍﻟﺒﺪﺍﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔ  (The Beginning and The 
End) by Ibn Katheer (total number of letters: 4,326,031) 
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Source 3: The Sealed Nectar: Biography of the Noble Prophet  ﺍﻟﺮﺣﻴﻖ ﺍﳌﺨﺘﻮﻡ   by Ar-
Raheeq Al-Makhtum (total number of letters: 553,740)
Source 4: The Masterpiece of the Brides  ﲢﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﻭﺳﲔ   by Al-shuri (total number of 
letters: 242,361 letters)  
Combined Total: 5,452,841 letters
Combining the data for the four original input sources.
There are a variety of valid arguments for using different data combinations of the 
four original input sources (or other input sources), or perhaps leaving each data input 
source on its own, for the use of particular topics.  Some of these arguments hold more 
value than others in topics such as language, religion, culture, or statistics.  For instance, 
if one is analyzing Middle Eastern religious texts, one would likely want to stay focused 
on The Quran data or other dialects pertaining to archaeological sites.  Furthermore, since 
The Quran is a religious text it may skew the statistical properties of other less religious 
text data.  This is due to the fact that The Quran is more prone to repeating certain 
religious words and phrases, and consequently, its data could potentially statistically alter 
the data of purely nonreligious material.  Religious and specific dialect data may also 
hold value if one is analyzing codes from ideological or religious websites in a particular 
region or country.  As for statistical purposes, an organization or company may want to 
collect data on all Arabic dialects, words, and characters from the vast sea of the Internet 
for marketing research, business intelligence, and government intelligence.  Another 
perhaps very subtle reason for combining religious and multiple dialect data, is that the 
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religious influence of Islam is almost at a constant in the Arab world in terms of language 
and can be seen and heard in most daily life activities. 
The data for the four original input sources have been combined by the author in 
order to reflect the combination of the topics of religious influence in the Arab world and 
the specific dialect of Modern Standard Arabic.  Therefore, the author states that these 
data are statistically relevant to this combination of topics and to this specific 
combination of topics only.  In terms of cryptanalysis, one could potentially benefit from 
this statistical data if the background of ciphertext warrants this reflection.
Figure 11. Letter frequencies and relative frequencies of the Modern Standard Arabic 
alphabet and its special characters.
x
ﺍ
ﺏ
ﺕ
ﺙ
ﺝ
ﺡ
ﺥ
ﺩ
ﺫ
ﺭ
ﺯ
ﺱ
ﺵ
Frequency
683,904
250,553
144,017
46,097
66,217
99,614
43,032
142,488
53,998
227,689
28,378
132,282
39,730
Relative Frequency
.125422
.045949
.026411
.008454
.012144
.018268
.007892
.026131
.009903
.041756
.005204
.024259
.007286
x
ﻍ
ﻑ
ﻕ
ﻙ
ﻝ
ﻡ
ﻥ
ﻩ
ﻭ
ﻱ
ﺃ
ﺇ
ﺁ
Frequency
17,914
154,034
144,837
114,900
656,656
360,593
365,916
274,960
321,877
347,804
156,998
56,141
9,003
Relative Frequency
.003285
.028248
.026562
.021072
.120425
.066129
.067106
.050425
.059029
.063784
.028792
.010296
.001651
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Note: Relative Frequency = Frequency/Total.  For example, 683,904/5,452,841= .125422
Figure 12. MSA character probability mass function.MSA Letter Frequency
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Interpretation of MSA letter frequency data.
It is quite obvious from the data that the two most frequent occurring letters in the 
MSA alphabet are “ ﺍ ” and “ ﻝ ”.  This is due to the fact that the particular digram 
combination of the two letters, “ ﺍﻝ  ” , is the definite article for MSA, which is the U.S. 
ﺹ
ﺽ
ﻁ
ﻅ
ﻉ
Total: 5,452,841  
55,301
24,326
26,695
9,812
214,996
.010142
.004461
.004896
.001799
.039428
ﺀ
ﺉ
ﻯ
ﺓ
ﺅ
17,510
15,572
68,656
75,296
5,045
.003211
.002856
.012591
.013809
.000925
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English equivalent of the word “the”, such as “the apple” or “the scooter.”  The indefinite 
articles for U.S. English are represented by the words “a” and “an”, for example, “an 
apple” or “a book.”  In MSA, indefiniteness is signified by the removal of “ ﺍﻝ  ” followed 
by nunation, which is given by the nunation case markers  ً  ،  ٍ ،   ٌ (Abboud & McCarus, 
1983, pp. 110-112).  This nunation was not considered in the four original input sources 
since it is a part of vowelization. 
2.4 Additional examples of CNN(C).
Affine cipher: The foreign students.
The affine cipher is a well-known cryptosystem within the field of cryptography 
and the following example parallels the same affine cipher found in Trappe and 
Washington (2006).  Again, this particular affine cipher uses MSA as well as the author’s 
own set of numerical values. 
Pakistan - Receiving news that some of Karim’s local messengers might be 
corrupt, Sami issues an order to his staff that all messages leaving the Hotel must be 
encrypted.  
Sami would like to send another message to his friend Maria in Dora telling her 
about some of the foreign students he has met over the last few weeks at one of the 
private universities.  Sami encrypts his message using an affine cipher and gives it to his 
doorman Mohammed for delivery.
For the affine cipher, Sami labels the letters of the MSA alphabet and special 
characters with the same integer values as in Figures 8 and 9.
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Sami’s message m to Maria is,
message m:
message translation:
“I met a number of Syrian and Egyptian students.  As for the Kuwaiti students,
I haven’t met one of them so far” (Abboud & McCarus, 1983, p. 206).
For the affine cipher, Sami uses the encryption formula (affine function),
f(x) ≡ (αx + β) mod 36
where gcd(α, 36) = 1 and β is an integer from the set {0, 1, . . . , 35}.
Sami selects α = 29 and β = 35 as the key and writes it as an ordered pair (α, β).  
So in this case, the key is (29, 35) and f(x) ≡ (29x + 35) mod 36.  Sami also makes sure 
that the greatest common divisor of 29 and 36 is equal to one or gcd(29, 36) = 1.  This 
property means that 29 and 36 are relatively prime and it guarantees that there exists an 
inverse for 29 modulo 36, and hence an inverse for the affine function. 
Figure 13. Affine cipher encryption.
.
ﻗﺎﺑﻠﺖ ﻋﺪﺩﺍ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻄﻼﺏ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺭﻳﲔ ﻭ ﺍﳌﺼﺮﻳﲔ، ﺃﻣﺎ  
ﺍﻟﻄﻼﺏ ﺍﻟﻜﻮﻳﺘﻴﻮﻥ ﻓﻠﻢ ﺍﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺍﺣﺪﺍ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﺣﺘﻰ ﺍﻻﻥ
plaintext
x
(29x + 35) mod 
36
ciphertext
plaintext
x
ﺏ
1
28
ﺃ
ﻥ
24
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
ﻱ
27
ﻝ
22
25
ﻩ
ﻱ
27
ﻁ
15
2
ﺕ
ﺭ
9
ﻝ
22
25
ﻩ
ﺹ
13
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
ﻡ
23
ﻥ
24
11
ﺱ
ﻝ
22
ﻡ
23
18
ﻍ
ﺍ
0
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
ﻭ
26
ﺩ
7
22
ﻝ
ﻥ
24
ﺩ
7
22
ﻝ
ﻱ
27
ﻉ
17
24
ﻥ
ﻱ
27
ﺕ
2
21
ﻙ
ﺭ
9
ﻝ
22
25
ﻩ
ﻭ
26
ﺏ
1
28
ﺃ
ﺱ
11
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
ﻝ
22
ﻕ
20
3
ﺙ
ﺍ
0
30
31
32
ciphertext:
ﺛﺆﺃﻫﻜﻨﻠﻠﺆﻏﺴﺆﻫﺘﻬﺆﺃﺅﻫﺂﻯﺫﻭﻭﺳﻰﺅﻫﻐﻈﺬﻭﻭﺳﻔﻐﺆﺅﻫﺘﻬﺆﺃﺅﻫﺌﻰﻭﻛﻮﻯﺳﺰﻫﻐﺆﺛﺆﺃﻫﺆﺍﻟﺆﻏﺴﺠﻐﺎﻛﻘﺆﻫﺆﺱ
decryption formula derivation:
f(x) ≡ (29x + 35) mod 36
f(x) ≡ (29x + 35) mod 36
f(x) - 35 ≡ (29x) mod 36
29
-1
(f(x) - 35) ≡  x mod 36
5(f(x) - 35) ≡  x mod 36
(5f(x) - 31) mod 36 ≡ x
This message is given to Mohammed for delivery.  In order for Maria to decrypt the 
ciphertext, she will need the corresponding key and cryptosystem decryption formula, 
(29x + 35) mod 
36
ciphertext
plaintext
x
(29x + 35) mod 
36
ciphertext
plaintext
x
(29x + 35) mod 
36
ciphertext
plaintext
x
(29x + 35) mod 
36
ciphertext
11
ﺱ
ﻭ
26
33
ﻯ
ﻡ
23
18
ﻍ
26
ﻭ
ﻱ
27
26
ﻭ
ﻩ
25
4
ﺝ
26
ﻭ
ﺕ
2
21
ﻙ
ﻥ
24
11
ﺱ
8
ﺫ
ﻱ
27
26
ﻭ
ﻡ
23
18
ﻍ
16
ﻅ
ﻭ
26
33
ﻯ
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
18
ﻍ
ﻙ
21
32
ﺉ
ﺩ
7
22
ﻝ
25
ﻩ
ﻝ
22
25
ﻩ
ﺡ
5
0
ﺍ
35
ﺅ
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
33
ﻯ
ﺏ
1
28
ﺃ
ﻝ
22
25
ﻩ
11
ﺱ
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
ﺏ
1
28
ﺃ
26
ﻭ
ﻝ
22
25
ﻩ
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
ﻥ
24
11
ﺱ
26
ﻭ
ﻁ
15
2
ﺕ
ﻕ
20
3
ﺙ
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
8
ﺫ
ﻝ
22
25
ﻩ
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
ﻝ
22
25
ﻩ
33
ﻯ
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
ﻡ
23
18
ﻍ
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
30
ﺁ
ﺍ
0
35
ﺅ
ﻝ
22
25
ﻩ
ﻯ
33
20
ﻕ
25
ﻩ
ﻡ
23
18
ﻍ
ﻑ
19
10
ﺯ
ﺕ
2
21
ﻙ
35
ﺅ
ﺃ
28
19
ﻑ
ﻥ
24
11
ﺱ
ﺡ
5
0
ﺍ
31
32
33
which are (29, 35) and (5y - 31) mod 36 ≡ x, respectively.  In this case, Sami will assign a 
new courier to deliver these items to Maria in three days.
Playfair cipher: The Pakistani government.
The Playfair cipher is a classical cryptosystem within the field of cryptography 
and the following example parallels the same Playfair cipher found in Trappe and 
Washington (2006).  Again, this particular Playfair cipher uses MSA. 
Afghanistan - Karim receives a letter from Sami asking if it is safe for their group 
to conduct operations in one particular area of the region without interference from the 
Pakistani government.  Karim decides to encrypt his message using the Playfair cipher.  
For the Playfair cipher, Karim chooses a word for the key.
Karim chooses the word,
ﻧﻘﻮﺩ
translation:
cash, money; coins
Having selected a key, Karim places his word in the first row of a 6 x 6 matrix and fills in 
the remaining spaces with the remaining letters of the alphabet (and special characters).  
If a letter is repeated in the key, one of the letters is omitted.  Karim’s key is in purple.
Karim’s matrix is therefore,
ﺏ
ﺫ
ﺽ
ﻙ
ﺍ
ﺥ
ﺹ
ﻑ
ﺩ
ﺡ
ﺵ
ﻍ
ﻭ
ﺝ
ﺱ
ﻉ
ﻕ
ﺙ
ﺯ
ﻅ
ﻥ
ﺕ
ﺭ
ﻁ
32
33
34
Karim’s message is,
ﻻ ﺗﺴﻤﺢ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻷﺻﺪﻗﺎﺋﻨﺎ ﺑﺎﻻﻗﺎﻣﺔ ﻫﻨﺎﻙ ﻃﻮﻳﻼ
general message translation (Abboud & McCarus, 1983):
The government does not permit our friends to stay there long.
Karim breaks his message into blocks of size 2 and adds an extra ﺏ in the last 
block.  This extra letter is chosen at random from the alphabet in order to complete a 
block of size 2.
Figure 14. Playfair cipher encryption.
Using his matrix, Karim derives the ciphertext from the following rules taken from 
Trappe and Washington (2006):
1. Letters that are not in the same row or column are replaced by the letters that are 
in the row and the column of the other letter.
ﺇ
ﺅ
ﺃ
ﺓ
ﻱ
ﻯ
ﻩ
ﺉ
ﻡ
ﺀ
ﻝ
ﺁ
ﻕ ﺍ
ﻥ ﺩ
ﻝ ﺍ
ﺃ ﻥ
ﺏ ﺍ
ﺍ ﺩ
ﻥ ﺍ
ﺏ ﺩ
ﺍ ﺉ
ﻭ ﺓ
ﺩ ﻕ
ﻭ ﻥ
ﺃ ﺹ
ﺓ ﻑ
ﺓ ﻝ
ﺁ ﺃ
ﻭ ﻡ
ﻕ ﻩ
ﺍ ﺏ
ﺩ ﺍ
ﺡ ﻙ
ﺫ ﻍ
ﻱ ﻝ
ﻩ ﺇ
ﺍ ﻝ
ﻥ ﺃ
ﻁ ﻭ
ﻉ ﻥ
 ﻡ ﺡ
ﻱ ﺙ
ﺍ ﻙ
ﺏ ﻑ
ﺕ ﺱ
ﺝ ﺭ
ﻩ ﻥ
ﻝ ﻭ
ﻝ ﺍ
ﺃ ﻥ
ﻡ ﺓ
ﺃ ﺀ
plaintext
ciphertext
plaintext
ciphertext
33
34
35
2. Letters that are in the same row are replaced by the letters to the right with the 
row continuously wrapping around the matrix.
3. Letters that are in the same column are replaced with the letters below with the 
column continuously wrapping around the matrix.
ciphertext:
ﺃ ﻥ ﺝ ﺭ ﻱ ﺙ ﻥ ﺃ ﺫ ﻍ ﻕ ﻩ ﺁ ﺃ ﺓ ﻑ ﻭ ﻥ ﻭ ﺓ ﺏ ﺩ ﺍ ﺩ ﺃ ﻥ ﻥ ﺩ ﺃ ﺀ ﻝ ﻭ ﺏ ﻑ ﻉ ﻥ ﻩ ﺇ ﺩ ﺍ
Karim then sends the key and the ciphertext to Sami separately.  Karim sends the 
key with a messenger to a particular dead drop site, whereby another messenger picks up 
the key and delivers it to Sami.  This dead drop method is repeated with a different 
location and with different messengers for the ciphertext.  The ciphertext is always 
delivered three days after the delivery of the key.
34
35
36
Figure 15. The Pakistani government network.
loc1
loc3
loc4
loc2
Location 1 Data Fields
• Location (Country - Afghanistan, 
town - Henna, description - near 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border, 
place - farmhouse)
• Persons of interest (Karim and 
friends, two messengers - 
unknown)
• Covert non-electronic 
communication methods 
(description - no electronics 
available, two different 
messengers deliver key and 
ciphertext to two different dead 
drop sites, cryptography - Playfair 
cipher - key and ciphertext)
Location 2 Data Fields
• Location (Town/place - unknown, 
description - near Afghanistan/
Pakistan border)
• Persons of interest (two 
messengers - unknown)
• Covert non-electronic 
communication methods 
(ciphertext exchange at dead drop 
site)
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The Vigenère cipher: The ghost.
The Vigenère cipher is a classical cryptosystem and the following example 
parallels the same Vigenère cipher method for encryption found in Trappe and 
Washtington (2006).  Again, this particular cipher uses MSA as well as the author’s own 
set of numerical values. 
Pakistan - Sami would like to inform Karim about his recent trip to the university.  
Moreover, he would like to notify Karim that he had a meeting with the university’s 
president and that the president received a letter from a very important man who goes by 
the alias of the Ghost.  Sami decides to encrypt his message using the Vigenère cipher 
(ignoring spaces and punctuation).
Sami’s message m is,
Location 3 Data Fields
• Location (Town/place - unknown, 
description - near Afghanistan/
Pakistan border)
• Persons of interest (two 
messengers - unknown)
• Covert non-electronic 
communication methods (key 
exchange at dead drop site)
Location 4 Data Fields
• Location (Country - Pakistan, 
town/place - a small town in 
Pakistan, description - near 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border)
• Persons of interest (Karim’s 
cousin Sami, two messengers - 
unknown)
• Covert non-electronic 
communication methods (two 
different messengers pick up key 
and ciphterext from two different 
dead drop sites and deliver them 
to Sami, cryptography - Playfair 
cipher - key and ciphertext)
⋅ ﻭﺻﻞ ﺭﺋﻴﺲ ﺍﳉﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﻭ ﻫﻮ ﻳﺤﻤﻞ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻫﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺢ
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general translation of message m:
The president of the university arrived while carrying an important letter from the 
Ghost.  If the Ghost leaves Damascus in the morning he will be here before the evening.
The letter:
Pakistan tries to follow a policy of non-alignment; that means it is not aligned 
with either the East or the West (Abboud & McCarus, 1983). 
For the Vigenère cipher, Sami chooses a vector v of length k for the encryption 
key.  In this case, Sami chooses an Arabic keyword for the vector, since the word can be 
broken down numerically and it can be easily remembered.  Sami chooses the Arabic 
keyword,
ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ
which means, 
election 
The length of the vector is 6, since the Arabic word has 6 letters.  Figures 8 and 9 give the 
corresponding vector v = (1, 0, 6, 2, 24, 0).  Remember, the entries of the vector are read 
right to left, as are the letters in the Arabic word.
ﺍ ﻥ ﺕ ﺥ ﺍ ﺏ  ←  0  24  2  6  0  1
⋅ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺗﺮﻙ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺢ ﺩﻣﺸﻖ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺼﺒﺎﺡ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻫﻨﺎ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﺀ
ﺍﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ :
ﲢﺎﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﻛﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺘﺒﻊ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ ﻋﺪﻡ ﺍﻻﻧﺤﻴﺎﺯ
⋅ ﻭ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﻣﻨﺤﺎﺯﺓ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻕ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺏ
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To encrypt his message, Sami repeatedly writes the vector below the plaintext and shifts 
each letter of the plaintext by the amount given in the corresponding vector entry (mod 
36), hence the Vigenère cipher contains multiple shift ciphers.  
Figure 16. Vigenère cipher encryption.
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42
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42
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ﺱ
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ﻱ
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ciphertext:
The line numbers in red are for cryptanalysis reference later.
Sami puts his ciphertext in an envelope and gives it to a courier.  He also sends 
the secret keyword and Arabic Vigenère square with another courier, who is told to take a 
different route. 
The Vigenère cipher: Cryptanalysis.
In order to analyze the Vigenère Cipher we need five things: 
1. Kasiski’s method
2. The frequency distribution of single ciphertext characters
ﺓ ﻝ ﺅ ﺍ ﺓ ﺍ ﺥ
ﺏ
1
1
2
ﺕ
ﻥ
ﺭ
9
0
9
ﺭ
ﺇ
ﻍ
18
6
24
ﻥ
ﺝ
ﻝ
22
2
24
ﻥ
ﺅ
ﺍ
0
24
24
ﻥ
ﻱ
ﻭ
26
0
26
ﻭ
ﻡ
ﺃ
28
1
29
ﺇ
ﺍ
ﻕ
20
0
20
ﻕ
ﺀ
ﺭ
9
6
15
ﻁ
ﻭ
ﺵ
12
2
14
ﺽ
ﻅ
ﻝ
22
24
10
ﺯ
ﻩ
ﺍ
0
0
0
ﺍ
ciphertext
plaintext
x
c
(x + c) mod 
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ciphertext
ﺃ
ﺕ
ﺃ
ﻥ
ﺕ
ﻍ
ﺍ
ﺓ
ﻭ
ﺵ
ﻑ
ﻝ
ﻝ
ﺓ
ﻥ
ﻝ
ﺀ
ﺃ
ﻭ
ﺥ
ﺥ
ﻉ
ﻡ
ﺅ
ﺃ
ﺕ
ﺽ
ﻥ
ﻥ
ﺕ
ﻩ
ﺍ
ﻝ
ﺵ
ﺱ
ﻩ
ﺽ
ﻁ
ﻥ
ﺓ
ﻉ
ﻡ
ﺩ
ﻕ
ﺍ
ﺱ
ﺫ
ﺍ
ﻥ
ﺅ
ﺥ
ﺏ
ﺥ
ﻍ
ﻭ
ﺥ
ﺕ
ﺍ
ﻡ
ﺏ
ﻥ
ﺕ
ﺏ
ﻭ
ﻥ
ﺭ
ﺯ
ﺥ
ﻍ
ﺀ
ﺝ
ﺫ
ﻅ
ﺇ
ﻥ
ﻥ
ﻱ
ﻥ
ﻭ
ﻥ
ﺝ
ﺕ
ﺝ
ﻥ
ﻥ
ﻝ
ﻥ
ﻥ
ﻥ
ﺵ
ﻁ
ﺅ
ﻥ
ﺱ
ﻝ
ﻙ
ﻙ
ﺱ
ﺃ
ﺡ
ﻱ
ﻭ
ﺃ
ﺏ
ﺯ
ﺥ
ﺯ
ﻩ
ﻩ
ﻡ
ﺇ
ﺉ
ﺱ
ﺕ
ﺍ
ﻝ
ﺍ
ﺍ
ﺍ
ﻕ
ﻁ
ﻁ
ﺥ
ﺩ
ﺥ
ﺫ
ﺃ
ﺀ
ﻁ
ﻥ
ﻥ
ﺯ
ﻁ
ﻯ
ﺹ
ﺕ
ﻭ
ﺽ
ﺏ
ﺱ
ﻉ
ﺯ
ﻥ
ﺭ
ﺱ
ﻅ
ﺯ
ﻭ
ﺡ
ﺡ
ﺍ
ﺱ
ﺍ
ﺩ
ﻩ
ﺍ
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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3. The measure of roughness
4. The index of coincidence
5. The monoalphabetic indices of coincidence for a set value of t
Kasiski’s method.
Kasiski’s method is a cryptanalysis technique that helps determine the number of 
alphabets t of a polyalphabetic substitution cipher.  Moreover, the value t represents the 
length of the unknown keyword, which is sometimes described as the number of 
monoalphabetic substitutions or shifts resulting from each individual letter of the 
keyword, hence the term polyalphabetic substitution.  Kasiski’s method is based on the 
idea that identical portions of plaintext encrypted with identical portions of the keyword 
produce identical portions of ciphertext (Menezes, van Oorschot, & Vanstone, 1997).  
With this said, it is then hypothesized that the number of characters between the initial 
starting points of identical portions of ciphertext is a multiple of the number of the 
alphabets or keyword length t.  Once a list of the possible number of alphabets or 
keyword length t is established, a statistical comparison of all individual ciphertext 
alphabets for each set value of t is made to the inherent properties of one particular source 
language alphabet.  Note, if all individual ciphertext alphabets contain identical 
characters to this particular source language alphabet, then the cipher is classified as a 
simple Vigenère cipher.  Furthermore, each ciphertext alphabet is a shift cipher of this 
original source language alphabet.  If the characters of the individual ciphertext alphabets 
differ from the characters of the original source language alphabet, the statistical 
properties of each ciphertext alphabet will still reflect the original properties of the source 
41
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language.  This is due to simple substitution, however; the cipher is not classified as a 
simple Vigenère cipher.
The frequency distribution of single ciphertext characters.
If the ciphertext is short, it is best to count the frequency of each character by 
hand.  If the ciphertext is long, it may be better to use software to count the frequency of 
each character. 
The measure of roughness.
The measure of roughness is a quantity that measures the deviation of plaintext 
(author’s emphasis) character relative frequencies from a uniform frequency distribution 
(UFD) for a given source language (Menezes et al., 1997).  The measure of roughness is 
defined as follows,
where n equals the number of distinct characters of the plaintext alphabet {an-1, an-2, . . . , 
a1, a0} from the source language, and pi are the corresponding character relative 
frequencies.  Hence, the measure of roughness can be quantified for any source language 
with plaintext alphabet {an-1, an-2, . . . , a1, a0}.  The term plaintext alphabet may be 
substituted by the term plaintext character set.  In practice, it would be wise to use 
software such as Intellyze (see Figure 11), to estimate the character relative frequencies pi 
of the plaintext alphabet from a large data set containing the source language.  This is due 
to the fact that character relative frequencies from a small source, say a handwritten 
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message, do not accurately reflect the overall structure of character relative frequencies 
for an entire source language.
To derive the MR we expand the expression below,
We can find the minimum value for the MR of the source language by looking at 
its value for a UFD.  For a UFD, every character ai of the plaintext alphabet occurs with 
equal probability pi = (1/n), therefore min(MR) = 0.  A maximum value for the MR 
occurs when the plaintext character relative frequencies pi of the source language are 
present (Menezes et al., 1997).  Note, however, that this maximum value is an 
approximation, since it is based on previously estimated character relative frequencies pi.  
This is given by max(MR) = ∑pi
2 - (1/n) = kp - (1/n), where kp = ∑pi
2 is called the 
roughness constant of the source language.  The roughness constant kp = ∑pi
2 is the 
probability that two randomly chosen characters from the plaintext alphabet of source 
language are in fact equal.  This is quite obvious since encryption of the source language 
is not present.
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The index of coincidence.
The index of coincidence (IC) is a quantity that measures the variation in 
ciphertext (author’s emphasis) character frequencies for a given ciphertext (Pieprzyk, 
Hardjono, & Seberry, 2003).  The formula for the index of coincidence is,
where L is the length of the ciphertext, and fi is the frequency of letter bi in the ciphertext 
alphabet {bn-1, bn-2, . . . , b1, b0} (Menezes et al., 1997).  The term ciphertext alphabet 
may be substituted by the term ciphertext character set.  Also note, that unlike the MR, 
character frequencies are used instead of character relative frequencies.
number of distinct character groups of size 2 that can be selected from the ciphertext 
when order of selection is not considered relevant (Ross, 2010).  Similarly, given a
 represents the number of distinct groups of size 2 that can be selected from the character 
group bi when order of selection is not considered relevant.  Therefore, the IC is the 
probability that a pair of identical ciphertext characters (bi, bi) from the ciphertext 
alphabet {bn-1, bn-2, . . . , b1, b0} with corresponding frequency fi, are the same for a 
given ciphertext of length L.
particular ciphertext character bi with frequency fi,  the binomial coefficient
Given a ciphertext of length L, the binomial coefficient represents the
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The IC is a direct estimate of the source language roughness constant, kp = ∑pi
2 
(Menezes et al., 1997), given that the ciphertext alphabet {bn-1, bn-2, . . . , b1, b0} and 
plaintext alphabet {an-1, an-2, . . . , a1, a0} are statistically identical.  For instance, in 
simple substitution, an augmented version of an English ciphertext alphabet {bn-1, bn-2, . . 
. , b1, b0} = {1, 2, 3, . . . , c, b, a} may represent the MSA plaintext alphabet {an-1, an-2, . . 
. , a2, a1, a0} = { ﺍ، ﺏ، ﺕ، . . . ، ﺓ، ﺅ }.  This would be accomplished by substituting the 
first letter of the MSA alphabet with the first letter of the English alphabet, the second 
letter of MSA with the second letter of English, and so on.  English numbers would 
replace the remaining MSA plaintext letters.  Although, a random ciphertext sample of 
length L with character frequencies fi would appear as English, it would statistically 
exhibit the MSA source language with plaintext character relative frequencies pi.  This is 
due to the fact that as L increases for the sample English ciphertext,  fi/L ≈ pi.  For now, 
we will assume that the character set of the ciphertext alphabet is identical to the 
character set of the plaintext alphabet.  As mentioned earlier, it would be wise to estimate 
the plaintext character relative frequencies pi of the source language with software. 
Proof (Pieprzyk et al., 2003).
Substituting fi ≈ L ⋅ pi into the formula for the IC above we get,
Letting L go to infinity, we get IC ≈ ∑pi
2.  Therefore, the IC approximates the 
roughness constant kp = ∑pi
2 of the source language.
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The monoalphabetic indices of coincidence for a set value of t.
For each ciphertext alphabet, compare its corresponding index of coincidence to 
the roughness constant of the source language.
Applying cryptanalysis to the ghost.
Statistically speaking, we assume that the ciphertext reflects the combination of 
the topics of religion and the MSA dialect. 
Kasiski’s method.
Looking at the ciphertext on p. 41, we notice that lines 4 and 5 both contain the 
trigram “ ﻥ ﺥ ﻝ  ”.  The number of characters between the initial starting points “ ﻥ ” of 
these two trigrams (making sure not to double count) is 18.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the number of alphabets or keyword length t is either 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, or 18. 
 
The frequency distribution of single ciphertext characters.
The frequency distribution of single ciphertext characters is directly computed 
from the ciphertext and its letter frequencies found on p. 41. 
Figure 17. Ciphertext frequency distribution.
ﺍ
ﺏ
ﺕ
ﺙ
ﺝ
ﺡ
ﺥ
12
5
9
0
3
3
9
ﻍ
ﻑ
ﻕ
ﻙ
ﻝ
ﻡ
ﻥ
3
1
2
2
7
4
21
46
47
48
The measure of roughness.
For the source language of MSA, there exists 36 distinct characters in the 
plaintext nonvowelized character set.  This plaintext character set is given by {an-1, an-2, . 
. . , a2, a1, a0} = { ﺍ، ﺏ، ﺕ، . . . ، ﺓ، ﺅ }, where n = 36 and 35 ≥ i ≥ 0.  Using the plaintext 
character relative frequencies from Figure 11 we can approximate the roughness constant 
kp for MSA.  For kp we get,
Therefore, max(MR) =  kp - (1/n) ≈ 0.0608 - (1/36) = 0.0330, is an approximate 
maximum for the MR of MSA.  The minimum value of the MR is taken from the UFD.
  0.0 ≤ MR ≤ 0.0330
ﺩ
ﺫ
ﺭ
ﺯ
ﺱ
ﺵ
ﺹ
ﺽ
ﻁ
ﻅ
ﻉ
3
3
2
6
8
3
1
3
6
2
3
ﻩ
ﻭ
ﻱ
ﺃ
ﺇ
ﺁ
ﺀ
ﺉ
ﻯ
ﺓ
ﺅ
5
8
2
7
2
0
3
1
1
3
3
kp  = = (.000925)2 + (.013809)2 + (.012591)2 + . . . + (.125422)2  
= 0.0608
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The MR relates to the index of coincidence, which is described below.
The index of coincidence.
Since IC ≈ ∑pi
2 = kp, we can find approximate lower and upper bounds for the IC 
of MSA.  Since IC ≈ ∑pi
2  = kp = MR + 1/n and 0.0 ≤ MR ≤ 0.0330, we know that 
0 + 1/n ≤ MR + 1/n ≤ 0.0330 + 1/n.  Here, 1/n = 1/36 = .0278. 
For MSA they are,
0.0278 ≤ IC ≤ 0.0608
For MSA cryptanalysis involving simple substitution or shifts, we are only 
concerned with ciphertext alphabets that have an IC value gravitating towards the upper 
bound value of 0.0608.  This is due to the fact that this value represents the roughness 
constant kp of MSA, and is therefore a strong indicator that a particular ciphertext 
alphabet exhibits the same statistical properties of the previously computed MSA 
character relative frequencies pi.  
It appears that the Internet only gives one source on the index of coincidence for 
Arabic; which specific dialect of Arabic this is for is not mentioned (note, English 
sources only).  The value is presently stated as IC = 0.075889 (3/1/2012).  This author 
contacted J. Seberry, a well-known cryptographer and computer scientist and an author of 
Fundamentals of Computer Security (2003).  Her reply confirmed that this value is 
incorrect and that there was an error in the original data (personal communication, May 8, 
2011; see Appendix A).
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The monoalphabetic indices of coincidence for a set value of t.
In practice, software should be used to compare the indices of coincidence for all 
ciphertext alphabets for all values of t to the roughness constant kp of MSA.  To save 
time, we assume t = 6 for the number of alphabets or keyword length and divide the 
ciphertext accordingly into 6 monoalphabetic groups (Pieprzyk et al., 2003).  These 
monoalphabetic groups are formed by individual character positions within the 
ciphertext.  The total length of the ciphertext is L = 156, therefore the first 
monoalphabetic group is given by character positions 6i, where i = 0, 1, 2, . . . 25, since 
L/6 = 156/6 = 26.  The second group is given by character positions 6i + 1, where i = 0, 1, 
2, . . . 25, and so on.  We then compose a separate ciphertext frequency distribution for 
each monoalphabetic group and compute its index of coincidence.
Figure 18. Monoalphabetic indices of coincidence.
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By comparing the respective index of coincidence of each group to the MSA 
roughness constant kp = ∑pi
2= 0.0608, the IC gives an approximate measure of how close 
the ciphertext frequency distribution is to the MSA plaintext frequency distribution.  With 
this said, we look at groups 1 and 5 since they both have an IC value of 0.0677, which is 
close to 0.0608.  The most frequently occurring letter in these two groups is “ ﺍ ”, so we 
assume  “ ﺍ ” is part of the overall keyword for positions 1 and 5.  Why?  The nice thing 
about MSA is that the most frequently occurring letter in the alphabet is the first letter of 
alphabet, which is “ ﺍ ”.  This means that the most frequently occurring letter in a simple 
substitution ciphertext should not only reveal the number of shifts, but also the actual 
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
2
2
1
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
.0477
0
0
0
1
1
0
4
1
3
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0.0677
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
2
1
0
3
0
0
0
1
0.0554
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
1
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0.1138
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
7
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0.0862
0
1
0
0
1
2
1
1
0
1
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.0677
ﻅ
ﻉ
ﻍ
ﻑ
ﻕ
ﻙ
ﻝ
ﻡ
ﻥ
ﻩ
ﻭ
ﻱ
ﺃ
ﺇ
ﺁ
ﺀ
ﺉ
ﻯ
ﺓ
ﺅ
IC
50
51
52
letter of the shift.  This property of MSA is called the alif property of simple 
substitution, since the letter “ ﺍ ” is pronounced alif.  This is different from U.S. English, 
where e is the most common letter.  This is demonstrated below for a shift by “ ﺙ ” for 
MSA and a shift “ i ” for American English.
MSA:
ﺍ + ﺙ = ﺙ
3 = (3 + 0) mod 36 
3 = ﺙ
American English:
e + i = m
(4 + 8) mod 26 =12
12 = m
Now looking at the IC values for groups 2 and 4, we can see that they are not far 
off from 0.0608.  The most frequent letter in group 2 is “ ﻥ ”, so by the alif property, the 
second letter of the keyword is “ ﻥ ”.  Next, for group 4, the most frequent letter is “ ﺥ”, 
so again by the alif property, “ ﺥ” is the fourth letter of the keyword.  For group 3, the 
most common letter is “ ﻥ ”, but in MSA, two consonants such as “ ﻥ ” cannot occur in a 
row, and since we have decided “ ﻥ ” is keyword letter for group 2 we must choose a 
different letter.  The next most common letter in group 3 is “ ﺕ ”, so this will be our 
choice for the third letter of the keyword.  For groups, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, our keyword is,
ﺍ ﻥ ﺕ ﺥ ﺍ ـ
Guessing “ ﺏ ” for the last letter of the key in group 6 we find that the keyword is,
ﺍ ﻥ ﺕ ﺥ ﺍ ﺏ  
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or,
ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ
which translates to “elections”.
The expected value of the index of coincidence.
Remember, the IC is the probability that a pair of identical ciphertext characters 
(bi, bi) from the ciphertext alphabet {bn-1, bn-2, . . . , b1, b0} with corresponding 
frequency fi, are the same for a given ciphertext of length L.  Letting T be the number of 
alphabets t of a polyalphabetic substitution cipher, the probability mass function for the 
index of coincidence with T alphabets is defined as follows:
P[T = 1] = simple substitution, 1 alphabet, or kp such that kp = ∑pi
2 is the 
roughness constant of the source language.
P[T = 2] = 2 alphabets
. . .
P[T = ∞] = kr = 1/n, where T is said to have an infinite number of alphabets t or an 
infinite period (Pieprzyk et al., 2003).  This statement is equivalent to saying that 
every character of the source language has equal probability.
The expected value for the index of coincidence of a polyalphabetic substitution 
cipher of t alphabets is given by,
where L is the length of the ciphertext, kp is defined as the roughness constant of the 
source language, and kr = 1/n, where n is the size of the source language alphabet 
(Menezes et al., 1997).  Many Internet sources and books claim that by tabulating values 
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of t with corresponding IC expected values, one can derive the number of alphabets t of 
the ciphertext by comparing these expected values to the IC of the source language (see. 
Menezes et al., 1997 pp. 249 -250).  However, this formula is statistical in nature and can 
give misleading results (Pieprzyk et al., 2003).
2.5 Hidden objects.
Hidden objects: Flashlight.
Pakistan - Sami and his friend Mohammed come up with a new way to exchange 
secret messages or codes in order to plan their next meeting.  The new plan involves 
writing a secret message or code on a small piece of plastic from an index card and then 
hiding it inside a flashlight.  The flashlight is then given to a courier or intermediary, who 
will deliver it to either Sami or Mohammed, hence resulting in two-way communication.  
Sami writes the Arabic word for the market “ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﻕ  ” with a dry-erase marker on the 
piece of plastic and inserts it into the flashlight (the plastic insert and dry-erase marker 
allows for re-use of the cryptosystem).  The figures below depict this process:
Figure 19. First step of hiding process.
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Figure 20. Second step of hiding process.
Figure 21. Third step of hiding process.
 
Part I Summary 
Although one may quickly jump at the opportunity to label covert non-electronic 
networks (CNN) and covert non-electronic networks combined with cryptography 
[CNN(C)] as primitive, obsolete, and perhaps fantasies of the imagination, one should 
note that covert non-electronic communication methods can often provide for an overall 
effective battlefield strategy.  Secret human networks comprising of unique non-
electronic communication methods can be extremely difficult to detect or observe if no 
prior knowledge is given beforehand regarding these network components.  These covert 
non-electronic methods, which can include drops, courier routes, drivers, cryptography, 
and steganography, can at times be very abstract and unyielding to those who wish to 
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observe or disrupt.  Therefore, CNN and CNN(C) must be taken very seriously by 
intelligence services across the globe.  Perhaps too much emphasis has been focused on 
electronic surveillance and the assumption that people will follow normal communication 
patterns.  As for combatting such networks, one must pay close attention to the individual 
features of a particular network and always be prepared to encounter an unexpected 
complexity, whether it be in regards to mathematics, intelligence, language, or culture.  
For more information on a real life example of a CNN, search how the C.I.A. was able to 
discover Osama bin Laden’s compound by tracking one of his couriers.
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PART II
Covert Electronic Networks and Arabic Cryptology Applications
The reality is that cybercrime is happening internationally among 
organized criminal groups, corporations, and governments, as well as 
at the individual hacker level.  Besides simply communicating about 
their various activities, one of the most frequent uses of the Internet 
by organized crime and terrorists alike is to launder money, which 
involves secret communication about that money as well as financial 
transactions that move it from account to account.  The Internet 
provides the perfect climate for criminals for several reasons.  It’s fast, 
it’s anonymous, it’s unregulated. (Cole, 2003, p. 93)
Now that one has seen how the art of hand-to-hand secret communication works, 
or as more recently stated, covert non-electronic networks, our attention will now shift in 
this part to more sophisticated covert networks involving modern day electronics.  
Returning to the Iranian example in part I, suppose now that the American spy has been 
given new orders to infiltrate an Iranian telecommunications company, called 
Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI).  The spy’s new orders state that he or she 
must infiltrate TCI through electronic means only, since non-electronic methods are just 
too dangerous at this particular point in time.  More specifically, the spy is told that he or 
she could possibly send an email containing a trojan horse to TCI, that when opened by 
an unsuspecting employee, uses code to obtain access to pieces of TCI’s mobile services 
infrastructure.  Once access has been granted, the spy will then use his or her computer 
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skills to locate the phone numbers and other important data of top Iranian government 
officials.  Some of the questions and concerns of this project might be: Is a trojan horse 
the fastest and most efficient electronic method available to the spy to achieve his or her 
goals?  If not, what are some alternative computer/electronic schemes that could be used 
instead?  For instance, is there an insider at the company who would be willing to encrypt 
the information and send it to the American spy with the corresponding encryption keys?  
Could the spy possibly create a fake identity and trick a naïve employee into giving what 
he or she wants over the phone?  Obviously such methods must be compared beforehand 
in terms of cost, time efficiency, and whether or not they place people or groups at risk or 
exposure to harm.
In the context of spy tradecraft, this part will describe a variety of ways in which 
two or more people can secretly communicate with one another with the support of 
electronic devices and applications such as cell phones, email, Internet forums, instant 
messaging, etc.  These covert electronic communication methods can include the use 
of contacts, electronic dead drops, specific computer terminal locations, cryptography, 
and steganography.  (Again, note that the word covert in this instance denotes an activity 
that is “secret” to the controllers of communication, but in fact may be exposed to 
outsiders.)  These covert electronic communication methods can rely entirely upon 
electronic devices/applications or they can depend upon both a combination of electronic 
devices/applications with cryptographic schemes.  When covert electronic 
communication methods are systematically combined together, they ultimately form 
covert electronic networks (CEN) or covert electronic networks combined with 
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cryptography (CEN(C)).  The main advantages of these types of secret networks are 
that they are fast, affordable, and easy to use (sometimes).  However, the benefits of such 
networks can often be short lived.  Disadvantages can include eavesdropping, 
wiretapping, and cryptanalysis, all of which can go undetected or remain silent in the 
background. 
We include a few theoretical examples that demonstrate how in this age of high-
tech electronics and other things like easy access to the Internet, such networks can be 
quickly formed without notice or detection by groups such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, 
jihadists, and other insurgents.  This part will also present how these covert electronic 
communication methods can be manipulated, expanded, and creatively altered by other 
factors (e.g., abstract electronic steganography) to achieve an objective that is specific to 
an individual covert network.  In the future, it is these structural modifications that will 
be of interest when categorizing CEN/CEN(C), and perhaps performing steganography 
analysis or cryptanalysis on a particular CEN or CEN(C).
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CHAPTER 3: Covert Electronic Networks (CEN)
Today terrorist groups are on the cutting edge of technology.  They use 
computers, the Internet, encryption, and steganography to conduct 
business.  If their cryptography is good, it can take decades to crack.  
If they use steganography, their transmission of data may go 
completely undetected. (Cole, 2003, p. 8)
3.1 Covert electronic communication methods.
All data fields located under the data field of covert electronic communication 
methods can be found in Figure 6.  We have provided some descriptions of these data 
fields below and how they relate to spy tradecraft. 
An electronic courier or messenger, is a trusted individual who is sent an 
electronic message by one party, and is expected to follow through by delivering the 
message (by electronic means only) to a second party at a specified location.  A covert 
electronic network can consist of multiple digital couriers, destinations, and vested 
parties.  An electronic contact, on the other hand, is a person or clandestine meeting 
between two parties over an electronic channel.  An electronic dead drop is an electronic 
depository or location where two parties agree to exchange secret information.  An 
example would be a computer file (Cole, 2003).  Electronic steganography is the 
electronic component of steganography, in which writing or text is hidden in an electronic 
setting such as an image file, audio file, word document, etc.  In order to save time we 
only consider examples of covert electronic networks combined with steganography and 
cryptography, which are provided in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: Covert Electronic Networks Combined with Cryptography [CEN(C)]
Unlike ordinary CEN, CEN(C) look to the field of cryptography to cleverly 
disguise all electronic communications.  For example, someone might choose to encrypt 
a text message by using a designated cryptosystem and key before he or she sends it to a 
contact.  As for the cryptosystems involved, someone could choose from a variety of 
cryptosystems such as: Hill cipher; transposition cipher; one-time pad; the Ron Rivest, 
Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman algorithm (RSA); and Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES).
4.1 Real life examples of al-Qaeda encryption software: Mujahideen Secrets 
ﺃَﺳْﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﳌُﺠﺎﻫِﺪﻳﻦ .
An al-Qaeda affiliated group, called the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)
 ﳉﺒْﻬَﺔ ﺍﻹﻋﻼﻣِﻴَﺔ ﺍﻹﺳْﻼﻣِﻴَﺔ ﺍﻟﻌَﺎﳌﻴَﺔ , and an Islamic Web forum named the Islamic Faithful/
Devoted Network or al-Ekhlaas Islamic Network ﺷَﺒَﻜَﺔ ﺍﻹﺧْﻼﺹ ﺍﻹﺳْﻼﻣِﻴَﺔ  , tried to use the 
Internet to distribute encryption software for the purpose of sending and receiving secret 
messages.  Encrypted messages were exchanged using symmetric and asymmetric 
encryption methods, such as AES and RSA algorithms, respectively.  For more 
information on symmetric and asymmetric encryption techniques, see Trappe and 
Washington (2006).
Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) ﺍﳉﺒْﻬَﺔ ﺍﻹﻋﻼﻣِﻴَﺔ ﺍﻹﺳْﻼﻣِﻴَﺔ ﺍﻟﻌَﺎﳌﻴَﺔ .
The Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) is a multi-media outlet, which is part of 
al-Qaeda’s “public relations” effort.  It spreads jihadi rhetoric and propaganda across 
media sources such as the Internet, television, magazines, and text messages.  Since the 
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Internet is a relatively safe place to post controversial information, GIMF uses the 
Internet as its primary source to distribute all types of jihad material.  These materials 
include short video clips of insurgent attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, first-person video 
games, and downloadable software.  According to www.globalsecurity.org, GIMF’s 
sphere of influence across the Internet is primarily centered around the country of 
Pakistan, which gives a good indication to where GIMF’s creators and maintainers 
operate.  One of GIMF’s most significant technical achievements in terms of computer 
programming was the release of a free encryption tool called Mujahideen Secrets in 2007 
(Danchev, 2008; Vijayan, 2008). 
Mujahideen Secrets 1 (MS1) - ﺃَﺳْﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﳌُﺠﺎﻫِﺪﻳﻦ ۱  - first edition.
We refer to this version of Mujahideen Secrets as MS1 for clarity purposes.  MS1 
gives users the option and capability to encrypt email messages using either symmetric or 
asymmetric encryption.  The symmetric, or private-key, encryption process uses AES 
algorithms with a Rijndael block length of 256 bits, while the asymmetric, or public-key, 
encryption process uses RSA algorithms with a 2048-bit length (Danchev, 2008).  Some 
other features of MS1 are listed below.
MS1 Features (Danchev, 2008):
• Uses the best five cryptographic algorithms in cryptography (AES finalist 
algorithms)
• Ultra strong symmetric encryption
• Pressure data ROM (the highest levels of pressure)
• Keys and encryption algorithms with ghost changing technology (stealthy 
cipher)
• Automatic identification decryption algorithm (cipher auto-detection)
• Program consisting of one facility file - does not need assistance to install and 
can run from portable memory
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• Files can be erased without the possibility of retrieving the files (file shredder)
Islamic Faithful/Devoted Network or Al-Ekhlaas Islamic Network ﺷَﺒَﻜَﺔ  
ﺍﻹﺧْﻼﺹ ﺍﻹﺳْﻼﻣِﻴَﺔ .
The Islamic Faithful Network, or al-Ekhlaas, was a popular U.S. based Islamic 
Web forum created by a man named Peterson Hoffman on January 22, 2006, in Amman, 
Jordan (Altman, 2008).  The website was first located on a server in Rochester, 
Minnesota and was password protected (Henry (2008c)).  In early January 2008, the site 
released what is known as, Mujahideen Secrets 2 or MS2 (author’s abbreviation), the 
second version of Mujahideen Secrets (MS1).  MS2 was discovered by J.M. Berger, a 
Cambridge, Massachusetts-based freelance journalist and documentary film-maker who 
specializes in terrorism (Techworld Staff, 2008).  Shortly after MS2’s release, al-Ekhlaas 
was “arguably the single most important al’Qaeda Web site in operation” with an 
estimated 17 million total visits (Altman, 2008).  The website then moved to a server in 
Tampa, Florida, which was owned by a company called Noc4hosts, Inc.  Once 
Noc4hosts, Inc. received word of jihad activity from authorities and computer security 
experts, the company quickly disabled and removed the site.  After the site’s second 
shutdown, it moved again to a server in Phoenix, Arizona where it was removed for a 
third time (Techworld Staff, 2008).  It is unclear as to why GIMF released MS1, but did 
not release MS2.
Mujahideen Secrets 2 (MS2) - ﺃَﺳْﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﳌُﺠﺎﻫِﺪﻳﻦ ۲  - second edition.
Like its predecessor, MS2 could be downloaded for free and created a lot of 
chatter on the Internet among jihadists.  In addition, both MS1 and MS2 allow users to 
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type Arabic script, as opposed to transliterated Arabic, which is often used on non-Arabic 
compatible devices and applications such as cell phones and instant messaging.  For 
example, the Arabic word ﺃَﺳْﺮﺍﺭ , meaning secrets, is pronounced “asraar”, therefore its 
English transliteration, keystroke, or typed equivalent is “asraar.”  
MS2 is an extension of MS1 and provides a number of new applications and 
features, which have been integrated into the older software.  Some of these new 
applications and features include increased portability and RSA security, the production 
of digital signatures, and the ability to encrypt Yahoo and MSN instant messages 
(Techworld Staff, 2008).  The increase of MS2’s portability makes it easier to distribute 
the software via a USB device for example.  Below is a complete list of all new features 
offered by MS2. 
MS2 Features (Danchev, 2008):
• Multicast encrypted via text messages supporting the immediate use forums 
(Secure Messaging)
• Transfer files of all kinds to be shared across text forums (Files to Text 
Encoding)
• Production of digital signatures
• Digital signatures of messages and files for authenticity
• Upgraded graphical user interface
• Improved RSA security encryption codes in order to handle functions such as 
key generation and key management
According to Paul Henry (2008a), MS2 also has, “the ability to take a binary file 
and encrypt it in such a way that the file can be posted in a pure ASCII or text-only 
format.”  Moreover, “as a result, individuals could use MS2 to encrypt files and post 
them on sites that aren’t even on the Internet - for instance, on a telephone-accessed 
bulletin board system” (Techworld Staff, 2008).  Additionally, MS2 is well-written, 
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harder to crack than MS1, and has fewer coding mistakes (Henry, 2008a).  The files also 
have a unique fingerprint, which can be used for tracking (Henry, 2008a).  
It seems that all websites offering the encryption tools MS1 and MS2 have been 
currently disabled.  According to Paul Henry (2008b), the codes for MS1 were broken by 
law enforcement authorities.  It is unclear whether MS2 codes have been broken.  The 
purpose behind al-Qaeda’s creation of both MS1 and MS2 is not difficult to explain; al-
Qaeda members desire a possible means of communicating with one another without 
exposing their plans of warfare to authorities.  More specifically, the software was 
created, “in order to support the Mujahideen in general and the Islamic State in Iraq in 
particular” (Reuters Group, 2008).  However, there is also a subtle purpose to the creation 
of the software from a technical standpoint.  One computer security expert states that, “al-
Qaeda supporters are building their own encryption tools because they are concerned that 
industry built and public encryption software contain back doors” (Henry, 2008c).  
Therefore, it is not far fetched to say that al-Qaeda is trying to adapt to the technological 
complexities of today’s world in order to stay active and covert.
4.2 Examples of CEN(C).
Hill cipher: Discussion.
The Hill cipher is a classical cryptosystem and the following example parallels the 
same Hill cipher technique found in Trappe and Washington (2006).  However, this 
particular Hill cipher uses Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) as well as the author’s own 
set of numerical values. 
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Iraq - Ibrahim would like to text message his friend Yassin (who lives in Yemen) 
to tell him about some discussions that took place last week among some key members of 
their political party.  Ibrahim knows that Yassin will relay this information to other 
members in the Yemen faction.  Ibrahim, however, is afraid that the text message will be 
intercepted by some members of an opposing party, so he decides to encrypt his message 
using the Hill cipher.
Ibrahim’s message m is,
ﺟﺮﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﺳﺒﻮﻉ ﺍﳌﺎﺿﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﺩﺛﺎﺕ ﻫﺎﻣّﺔ
translation (Abboud & McCarus, 1983):
Important discussions took place last week.
For the Hill cipher, Ibrahim chooses an n x n matrix M for a key whose entries are 
integers mod 36 and gcd(det(M), 36) = 1.  Ibrahim chooses the matrix,
such that n = 3.  Ibrahim then checks if M is invertible modulo 36.  If M is invertible mod 
36, then Ibrahim knows that his friend Yassin will be able to decrypt the ciphertext into 
the original plaintext.  In order to do this, Ibrahim computes det(M) ≡ 13237 (mod 36) ≡ 
25 and checks if gcd(det(M), 36) = gcd(25, 36) = 1.  Therefore, Ibrahim knows that there 
exists an inverse N such that MN ≡ I (mod 36), where I is the identity matrix.
It follows that the inverse of M is,
M =
3
16
10
14
4
33
27
17
3
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Here, (13237) mod 36 ≡ 25.  Also, Ibrahim replaces (1/25) or 25
-1 
with 13, since 13 is the 
inverse of 25 mod 36.  Therefore, after multiplying each entry above by the scalar 13, in 
addition to reducing each entry by modulo 36, Ibrahim gets,
Ibrahim now checks that,
To encrypt his message, Ibrahim decomposes his message m into a series of row 
vectors of length n and multiplies each row vector by matrix M on the right.  The entries 
of the row vectors are read right to left.
(1/13237)
-549
122
488
849
-261
41
130
381
-212
(1/25)
-549
122
488
849
-261
41
130
381
-212
N ≡
27
2
8
21
27
29
34
21
16
MN ≡
3
16
10
14
4
33
27
17
3
27
2
8
21
27
29
34
21
16
≡ I (mod 36)
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67
68
Figure 22. Hill cipher encryption.
ciphertext,
ﺙ ﻅ ﺯ ﺵ ﻁ ﺯ ﺙ ﻅ ﺏ ﺝ ﻁ ﺭ ﻡ ﺽ ﻩ ﺀ ﺕ ﻉ ﺯ ﻡ ﻝ ﺍ ﻱ ﺯ ﺅ ﻝ ﻥ ﺅ ﺀ ﻍ  
Sitting in a café, Ibrahim sends the matrix key directly to Yassin in Yemen using 
his computer.  Ibrahim then sends the ciphtertext separately as a cell phone text message 
to his friend Alliya who lives in Saudi Arabia.  Alliya then relays this text message on his 
cell phone to his friend Fadil in Saudi Arabia.  Once again, Fadil texts this ciphertext to 
another person in Saudi Arabic who ultimately text messages it to Yassin in Yemen.
v5
ﺍ ﻝ ﻡ
(23, 22, 0)
(25, 14, 23)
ﻡ ﺽ ﻩ
v10
ﻡ ﺓ ﺍ
(0, 34, 23)
(18, 31, 35)
ﺅ ﺀ ﻍ
v4
ﺏ ﻭﻉ  
(17, 26, 1)
(9, 15, 4)
ﺝ ﻁ ﺭ
v9
ﺕ ﻩ ﺍ
(0, 25, 2)
(24, 22, 35)
ﺅ ﻝ ﻥ
v3
ﻝ  ﺍ ﺱ
(11, 0, 22)
(1, 16, 3)
ﺙ ﻅ ﺏ
v8
ﺩ ﺙ ﺍ
(0, 3, 7)
(10, 27, 0)
ﺍ ﻱ ﺯ
v2
ﻑ ﻱ ﺍ
(0, 27, 19)
(10, 15, 12)
ﺵ ﻁ ﺯ  
v7
ﻡ ﺡ ﺍ
(0, 5, 23)
(22, 23, 10)
ﺯ ﻡ ﻝ
v1
ﺝ ﺭ ﺕ
(2, 9, 4)
(10, 16, 3)
ﺙ ﻅ ﺯ
v6
ﺍ ﺽ ﻱ
(27, 14, 0)
(17, 2, 31)
ﺀ ﺕ ﻉ
plaintext
vi
(vi M) mod 36 
ciphertext
plaintext
vi
(vi M) mod 36
ciphertext
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Figure 23. The discussion network.
loc1
loc5
loc4
loc3
loc2
Location 1 Data Fields
• Location (country - Iraq, town/
place - unknown, description - in 
a café)
• Persons of interest (Ibrahim - 
friend to Alliya and Yassin)
• Covert electronic communication 
methods (description - electronics 
available, hardware - cell phone 
and computer, cryptography - Hill 
cipher - Ibrahim sends matrix key 
directly to Yassin in Yemen using 
his computer, Ibrahim then sends 
the ciphertext separately in a text 
message to his friend Alliya in 
Saudi Arabia)
Location 2 Data Fields
• Location (country - Saudi Arabia, 
town/place - unknown, 
description - none)
• Persons of interest (Alliya - 
Ibrahim’s friend)
• Covert electronic communication 
methods (hardware - cell phone, 
cryptography - receiver of Hill 
cipher text message ciphertext 
from Ibrahim, Alliya then text 
messages the ciphertext to his 
friend Fadil in Saudi Arabia)
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Location 3 Data Fields
• Location (country - Saudi Arabia, 
town/place - unknown, 
description - none)
• Persons of interest (Fadil - friend 
of Alliya)
• Covert non-electronic 
communication methods 
(description - electronics 
available, hardware - cell phone, 
cryptography - receives the Hill 
cipher ciphertext from Alliya and 
text messages it to an unknown 
friend in Saudi Arabia)
Location 5 Data Fields
• Location (country - Yemen, 
description - large city located 
near the harbors, place - 
unknown)
• Persons of interest (Yassin - 
friend to Ibrahim)
• Covert non-electronic 
communication methods 
(hardware - cell phone and 
computer, cryptography - receives 
the Hill cipher key on his 
computer from Ibrahim, receives 
the ciphertext from an unknown 
person via text message)
Location 4 Data Fields
• Location (country - Saudi Arabia, 
town/place - unknown, 
description - none)
• Persons of interest (person - 
unknown, friend to Fadil and 
Yassin)
• Covert non-electronic 
communication methods 
(description - electronics 
available, hardware - cell phone, 
cryptography - receives the Hill 
cipher ciphertext from Fadil and 
text messages it to Yassin in 
Yemen)
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In practice, the size of n for Ibrahim’s original n x n key matrix M may in fact be 
considerably larger, thus requiring more computational power for calculations.  A 
powerful, yet affordable computer program such as MATLAB, may be used as a quick 
and efficient supplement for tedious hand calculations involving modular arithmetic and 
inverses of matrices.  
Transposition cipher: The Yemeni camp.
The transposition cipher is a classical cryptosystem and the following example 
parallels the same transposition cipher technique described in Menezes et al. (1997).  
However, this cipher uses MSA as well as this author’s own set of numerical values.  
Note, the term transposition is synonymous with the term permutation.
Yemen - Yassin has been told by his superiors that he must report back to Ibrahim 
about the movement of troops in a particular Yemini camp over the last three months.  In 
addition, he must describe how many troops are attending the camp and where they are 
coming from.  Yassin gathers this information from a few of his sources and composes 
his message.
Yassin’s message m is,
ﻳﺼﻞ ﺍﳌﻌﺴﻜﺮ ﺍﻟﻴﻤﻨﻲ ﻛﻞ ﻳﻮﻡ ﻋﺪﺩ ﻛﺒﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﻘﺎﺗﻠﲔ ﻣﻦ ﺩﺍﺧﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻼﺩ ﻭ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻬﺎ
translation (Abboud & McCarus, 1983): 
Every day the Yemeni camp receives a large number of fighters from within and from 
outside the country.
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Yassin encrypts his message using the transposition cipher.  For the transposition 
cipher, Yassin considers a finite set S = {k, . . . , 3, 2, 1}, where k represents the 
cardinality of S.  The elements of the set S are listed in decreasing order because Arabic 
is read right to left.  Yassin chooses length k = 5, therefore S = {5, 4, 3, 2, 1}.  Yassin then 
selects a permutation of S as the key; for example, the permutation given by,
p(5) = 2,  p(4) = 1,  p(3) = 5,  p(2) = 3,  p(1) = 4
Figure 24. Transposition cipher encryption.
p = 
5
2
4
1
3
5
2
3
1
4
p
-1
 = 
5
3
4
1
3
2
2
5
1
4
5
ﻥ
ﻱ
5
ﻥ
ﺭ
5
ﻝ
ﺍ
5
ﺉ
ﺍ
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ﺍ
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ﺏ
4
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ﺍ
ﺏ
4
ﺍ
ﻱ
4
ﻱ
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4
ﻕ
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4
ﻝ
ﺍ
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ﺹ
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ﻝ
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3
ﻡ
ﻝ
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ﻝ
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ciphertext:
Yassin sends his encrypted message over his cell phone and tells his friend to send the 
key to Ibrahim in a particular Internet chat room.
One-time pad: A sensitive conversation.
The one-time pad is a classical cryptosystem and the following example parallels 
the same one-time pad cipher technique found in Trappe and Washington (2006).  
However, this cipher uses MSA as well as the author’s own set of numerical values.  The 
term one-time pad is synonymous with the term Vernam cipher.
Iraq - Yassin and Ibrahim are just finishing up a conversation on what type of 
design they would like to incorporate into the flag of their political party.  They know that 
the design of their new flag could cause unrest and stir hatred among other opposing 
parties and for this reason, Yassin and Ibrahim decide to encrypt their messages using a 
series of one-time pads. 
Ibrahim’s last message m to Yassin is,
 ﺷﻜﺮﺍ.  ﺃﻧﺴﺘﻄﻴﻊ ﺃﻥ ﻧﺘﺎﺑﻊ ﺑﺤﺚ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻏﺪﺍ؟
translation (Abboud & McCarus, 1983):
Thanks.  Can we continue the discussion of the flag tomorrow?
ﻱ
ﺭ
ﺍ
ﺍ
ﺍ
ﺏ
ﻥ
ﺝ
ﻝ
ﻱ
ﺩ
ﻩ
ﻥ
ﻥ
ﻝ
ﺉ
ﻡ
ﻡ
ﺥ
ﺉ
ﺱ
ﺩ
ﻱ
ﺥ
ﻡ
ﻡ
ﺕ
ﺩ
ﻉ
ﻉ
ﻝ
ﻭ
ﺭ
ﻙ
ﻡ
ﺭ
ﻙ
ﺩ
ﻥ
ﺍ
ﻝ
ﻝ
ﻡ
ﺏ
ﻱ
ﻱ
ﺍ
ﺍ
ﺹ
ﻙ
ﻝ
ﻝ
ﻝ
ﻭ
ﺍ
ﺍ
ﺍ
ﻱ
ﻕ
ﻝ
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For the one-time pad, Ibrahim converts his Arabic message m into binary or a 
string of 1s and 0s, whereby the binary version of m is also read right to left.  In order to 
do this, Ibrahim assigns a unique sequence of one or more bits, called a bitstring, to each 
letter of MSA and to any other symbol he wishes to encrypt.  In this case, Ibrahim 
chooses bit string combinations of length seven.  This will allow Ibrahim to assign 2
7 
= 
128 possible bitstring combinations to different text values.  Once this has been done, 
Ibrahim creates what is known as a look-up table, which is a written or an electronic 
document used by two or more network parties during the coding and decoding process, 
to convert all textual characters to their respective numerical values, and vice-versa.   In 
this case, the numerical values are bitstrings.  This means that Ibrahim will somehow 
have to physically send or electronically communicate an identical copy of his look-up 
table to Yassin before Yassin is able to successfully convert the binary plaintext back into 
ordinary text.  Yassin will also need a key in this case since they are using one-time pads.  
Ibrahim and Yassin’s binary look-up table for MSA and a few other symbols is provided 
below.
Figure 25. Random binary representations.
ﺍ
ﺏ
ﺕ
ﺙ
ﺝ
ﺡ
0101000
0110000
0111000
1000000
0100001
0101001
ﻍ
ﻑ
ﻕ
ﻙ
ﻝ
ﻡ
1000011
0100100
0101100
0110100
0111100
1000100
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Having converted his message m to a binary string, Ibrahim then generates a 
random string of binary with length equivalent to m for the key.  For simplicity 
concerning hand calculations, Ibrahim assumes that the binary key for his message is 
random.  Ibrahim then performs the bit operation bitwise exclusive or, frequently 
denoted XOR, on the two strings.  This bit operation is provided in detail in the table 
below.
ﺥ
ﺩ
ﺫ
ﺭ
ﺯ
ﺱ
ﺵ
ﺹ
ﺽ
ﻁ
ﻅ
ﻉ
0110001
0111001
1000001
0100010
0101010
0110010
0111010
1000010
0100011
0101011
0110011
0111011
ﻥ
ﻩ
ﻭ
ﻱ
ﺃ
ﺇ
ﺁ
ﺀ
ﺉ
ﻯ
ﺓ
ﺅ
.
؟
0100101
0101101
0110101
0111101
1000101
0100110
0101110
0110110
0111110
1000110
0100111
0101111
0110111
0111111
Exclusive Or/XOR
x
0
0
1
1
y
0
1
0
1
x ⊕ y
0
1
1
0
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Note that XOR is the same as adding corresponding bits mod 2, therefore Ibrahim 
writes the key directly below the message and adds them together mod 2.  The result is a 
binary string of ciphertext.  This bit operation can be performed even faster with a 
computer.
Figure 26. One-time pad encryption.
.
0110111
1011100
1101011
ﻁ
0101011
0110111
0011100
ﻥ
0100101
0000001
0100100
ﺏ
0110000
1110111
1000111
ﻉ
0111011
0010010
0101001
ﺍ
0101000
0101010
0000010
ﺍ
0101000
0011011
0110011
ﺕ
0111000
1111110
1000110
ﻥ
0100101
0110001
0010100
ﻉ
0111011
0101110
0010101
ﻝ
0111100
0010101
0101001
ﺩ
0111001
1110110
1001111
ﺭ
0100010
1101011
1001001
ﺱ
0110010
0000100
0110110
ﺃ
1000101
1010111
0010010
ﺏ
0110000
0000111
0110111
ﺍ
0101000
1111111
1010111
ﻍ
1000011
0001110
1001101
ﻙ
0110100
1111000
1001100
ﻥ
0100101
0000011
0100110
ﻉ
0111011
0111000
0000011
ﺍ
0101000
1101111
1000111
ﺙ
1000000
0011100
1011100
ﻡ
1000100
0000000
1000100
ﺵ
0111010
1000111
1111101
ﺃ
1000101
0010101
1010000
ﻱ
 0111101
 0011001
 0100100
ﺕ
0111000
0000101
0111101
ﺡ
0101001
0000110
0101111
ﻝ
0111100
1110110
1001010
plaintext
binary
key
ciphertext
plaintext
binary
key
ciphertext
plaintext
binary
key
ciphertext
plaintext
binary
key
ciphertext
plaintext
binary
key
ciphertext
plaintext
binary
key
ciphertext
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ciphertext:
 
1101011 0110011 1001001 1001100 1111101
0011100 1000110 0110110 0100110 1010000
0100100 0010100 0010010 0000011  0100100
1000111 0010101 0110111 1000111 0111101
0101001 0101001 1010111 1011100 0101111
0000010 1001111 1001101 1000100 1001010
0000010
The task of assigning letters different bitstrings is similar to substitution in the 
sense that in substitution, one assigns different integer values to the letters of the 
alphabet.  Look-up tables, in general, do not always have to contain numerical values 
assigned to respective text characters.  That is to say, one may also substitute entire words 
with numerical or text values.  Such a table is called a dictionary look-up table.
Given that a particular one-time pad is unbreakable, it may be possible for 
authorities to record keystrokes or use computer forensics software to retrieve unknown 
keys.
Audio steganography: The call to prayer.
Yemen - Yassin would like to send a one-time pad cipher (on p. 76) using 
steganography to his friend Ibrahim who is living in Iraq.  Yassin will send the key for the 
one-time pad at a later date in the mail to Ibrahim disguised as a series of barcodes on 
some new pirated DVDs (see p. 76 for the key; also pirated DVDs and pirated DVD 
covers are very common in the Middle East and North Africa and can usually be bought 
؟
0111111
0111101
0000010
plaintext
binary
key
ciphertext
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on the street for about one American dollar).  Yassin decides to use a freeware 
steganography CD-ROM program that accompanies the book Hiding In Plain Sight 
(Cole, 2003) to embed the cipher into an audio file, or more specifically, a WAV song file. 
Steps 1-9 show the process of how Yassin accomplishes this task.
Step 1.
Yassin installs the main steganography program, called stego, from the Hiding In 
Plain Sight CD-ROM onto his computer.  Yassin will run routines 9 and 10 from the 
stego program on the command-line prompt for the encoding and decoding processes, 
respectively.  Routine 9 is called WAV Twiddle encode and routine 10 is called WAV 
Twiddle decode.  
Step 2. 
Before running routines 9 and 10, Yassin uses the Internet to download a free 
MP3 Muslim prayer song, Call to prayer in Jakarta (djbacon, 2004), from Masjid 
Baiturrahman Bintaro, a mosque located in Jakarta, Indonesia.  He then converts his MP3 
prayer song to a WAV file, since the steganography program only works with WAV files.  
This song is saved as Masjid_Baiturrahman_Bintaro_Jakarta_0.wav (this may be done 
with any freeware MP3 WAV converter available on the Internet).  To start the encoding 
process, Yassin writes and saves his one-time pad into a .txt file called covert.txt.
Step 3.
Yassin saves the covert.txt file, the song .wav file 
Masjid_Baiturrahman_Bintaro_Jakarta_0.wav, and the stego application or program in 
the file called StegoTwiddle.
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Step 4.
Yassin runs routine 9 to encode or embed his one-time pad message in the 
covert.txt file into the new .wav file called new_song_twiddle.wav.  This new song file 
will contain Yassin’s covert.txt message and will sound identical to the original song.  
That is, the tampering of the sound of this new song with the added covert.txt data will be 
indiscernible to the human ear.
Step 5.
The new song (new_song_twiddle) containing the hidden message can now be 
found in the StegoTwiddle file.
Step 6.
Yassin checks that he can extract the covert.txt data from the new song by running 
routine 10.  This will ensure that Ibrahim will be able to successfully extract or decode 
the covert.txt from the new song.  In order to accomplish this task, Yassin must create a 
new .txt file called covert.decoded.twiddle.txt.  This new file will receive the covert.txt 
data from the new song during the extraction process and not the actual covert.txt file. 
Step 7.
The covert.decoded.twiddle.txt file can now be found in the StegoTwiddle folder.
Step 8.
Opening the new covert.decoded.twiddle.txt file reveals the original message or 
one-time pad.
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Step 9. 
A comparison of the two songs in a Hex Editor program reveals that the two 
songs are in fact different.  This proves that the new song contains the original covert.txt 
message.
Figure 27. Hex editor: Song comparison. 
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Step 10. 
Yassin sends a box of new pirated DVDs to Ibrahim in the mail with barcodes 
containing sections of the key of the one-time pad.  The last two digits of the barcodes 
reveal the order in which they must be placed to form the original key.
RSA: The harbor.
The following RSA algorithm parallels the same RSA algorithm found in Trappe 
and Washington (2006).  However, this RSA example uses MSA as well as this author’s 
own set of numerical values.
Iraq - Ibrahim has informed Yassin that he has discovered a new and more secure 
way to encrypt their messages online using a public key cryptosystem called the RSA 
algorithm.  For the RSA algorithm, Ibrahim follows four simple preliminary steps:
Preliminary steps (Trappe & Washington, 2006).
i. Ibrahim chooses two distinct primes, say p = 4789 and q = 2971, and computes 
their product.
n = pq = 14228119
Ibrahim keeps these two distinct primes secret, since their relationship uniquely 
determines the procedures of encryption and decryption conducted by Yassin and 
Ibrahim, respectively.  
ii. Next, Ibrahim computes φ(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) = (4788)(2970) = 14220360 and 
selects an encryption exponent e such that e and φ(n) are relatively prime.  In order for e 
and φ(n) to be relatively prime, gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1.  Ibrahim chooses e = 7657117 and 
checks that gcd(7657117, 14220360) = 1 using the Euclidean algorithm.  For the 
Euclidean algorithm, Ibrahim divides the larger of the two numbers by the other number 
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to give a quotient q1 and a remainder r1.  Ibrahim assumes φ(n) is greater than e.  This is 
written as φ(n) = q1 ⋅ e + r1.  Here, if e perfectly divides φ(n), then of course r1 = 0.  If 
φ(n) > 0 and e = 0, then q1 =  0 and r1 = 0.  Ibrahim assumes that neither φ(n) or e is 
equal to zero.  If r1 ≠ 0, then the remainder r1 is clearly able to divide the number e from 
the original expression φ(n) = q1 ⋅ e + r1, such that there exists a new quotient q2 and a 
new remainder r2.  This is due to the fact that r1 < e, whereby r1 is indeed the remainder 
of φ(n) divided by e.  By continuation of this quotient and remainder process, the 
expression for the smaller number e is similarly written as e = q2 ⋅ r1 + r2.  The next 
expression for r1 is given by r1 = q3 ⋅ r2 + r3.  This process is continued until a remainder 
of zero is achieved.  Ibrahim’s Euclidean algorithm calculations are given below:
    
        14220360 = 1 ⋅ 7657117 + 6563243
           7657117 = 1 ⋅ 6563243 + 1093874
           6563243 = 5 ⋅ 1093874 + 1093873
1093874 = 1 ⋅ 1093873 + 1
1093873 = 1093873 ⋅ 1 + 0
Note that the last nonzero remainder is the greatest common divisor.
iii. Ibrahim then computes d such that de ≡ 1(mod (p - 1)(q - 1)) ≡ 1(mod φ(n)), [d 
is the inverse of e modulo φ(n)], using the Extended Euclidean algorithm.  Since e = 
7657117 and φ(n) = 14220360 are relatively prime, there exists integers x and y such 
that,
ex + φ(n)y = gcd(x, y) = 1
For the Extended Euclidean algorithm, Ibrahim sets x0 = 0, x1 = 1,
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and defines xj = - qj - 1 xj - 1 + xj - 2 for 1 ≤ qi ≤ n, where qi are the quotients found in the 
Euclidean algorithm:
exn + φ(n)yn = gcd(a, b) = 1
The quotients from the Euclidean algorithm in ii. are q1 = 1, q2 = 1, q3 = 5, q4 = 1, q5 = 1 
(from top to bottom).
Setting x0 = 0, x1 = 1, Ibrahim gets,
 x2 = - 1x1 + x0 = - 1
x3 = - 1x2 + x1 = 2
   x4 = - 5x3 + x2 = - 11
  x5 = - 1x4 + x3 = 13
Ibrahim now knows that exn + φ(n)yn = 7657117 ⋅ x5 + 14220360 ⋅ y5  = gcd(x5, y5) = 1, 
such that x5 = 13.  Therefore, Ibrahim shows that d = 13 is the inverse of e modulo φ(n),
7657117 ⋅ x5 + 14220360 ⋅ y5 = 1
7657117 ⋅ 13 + 14220360 ⋅ y5 = 1
(7657117 ⋅ 13 + 14220360 ⋅ y5) (mod 14220360) ≡ 1(mod 14220360)
7657117 ⋅ 13 ≡ 1(mod 14220360)
Hence, 7657117d ≡ 1(mod 14220360), where d ≡ 13 (mod 14220360).
iv. Ibrahim keeps his private key, (p, q, d) = (4789, 2971, 13), secret and sends 
his public key, (e, n) = (7657117, 14228119), to Yassin in Yemen.
Encryption (Trappe & Washington, 2006).
Yemen - Yassin and his friend Yusef have just returned from a small trip to the 
docks of one of the city’s many harbors.  During their trip, they met with an old man who 
showed them an inexpensive piece of real estate near the waterfront.  Eager to report back 
to Ibrahim about his trip, Yassin sits down at his computer and downloads Ibrahim’s 
public key, (e, n) = (7657117, 14228119).  He then types the following MSA message.
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Yassin’s message m,
ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ ﺑﻪ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﳌﻴﻨﺎﺀ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺼﺒﺎﺡ. ﻻ ﺷﻲﺀ   
translation (Abboud & McCarus, 1983):
We went with him to the harbor in the morning.  There is nothing.
To encrypt his message m using the RSA algorithm, Yassin uses the formula,
c ≡ m
e 
(mod n)
c ≡ m
7657117
(mod 14228119)
1. First labeling attempt.
Next, in order to represent his message m in numeric form, Yassin labels the MSA 
alphabet and its special characters using the numeric values given below.
Yassin, however, notices that the word “ ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ  ” from his message loses the final character 
“ ﺍ ” during encryption because its value is zero.  This is shown below.
ﻱ
27
ﻭ
26
ﻩ
25
ﻥ
24
ﻡ
23
ﻝ
22
ﻙ
21
ﻕ
20
ﻑ
19
ﻍ
18
ﻉ
17
ﻅ
16
ﻁ
15
ﺽ
14
ﺹ
13
ﺵ
12
ﺱ
11
ﺯ
10
ﺭ
9
ﺫ
8
ﺩ
7
ﺥ
6
ﺡ
5
ﺝ
4
ﺙ
3
ﺕ
2
ﺏ
1
ﺍ
0
ﺅ
35
ﺓ
34
ﻯ
33
ﺉ
32
ﺀ
31
ﺁ
30
ﺇ
29
ﺃ
28
1st labeling attempt trial
0241258
c ≡ _241258
7657117
(mod 14228119)
ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ
c ≡ m
7657117
(mod 14228119)
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2. Second labeling attempt.
To solve this problem, Yassin relabels the MSA Alphabet and its special 
characters starting at one.
This time, Yassin notices that although he solves the problem of the disappearing “ ﺍ ”, 
from the word “ ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ  ”, another phrase from his message containing the same number of 
characters with an “ ﺍ ”, namely the phrase “ ﻻ ﺷﻲﺀ  ”, appears to have a different number 
of digits during encryption.  Yassin suspects that this will cause future encryption and 
decryption problems.
3. Third labeling attempt.
To solve this problem, Yassin pads the first nine digits with zeros.
ﻱ
28
ﻭ
27
ﻩ
26
ﻥ
25
ﻡ
24
ﻝ
23
ﻙ
22
ﻕ
21
ﻑ
20
ﻍ
19
ﻉ
18
ﻅ
17
ﻁ
16
ﺽ
15
ﺹ
14
ﺵ
13
ﺱ
12
ﺯ
11
ﺭ
10
ﺫ
9
ﺩ
8
ﺥ
7
ﺡ
6
ﺝ
5
ﺙ
4
ﺕ
3
ﺏ
2
ﺍ
1
ﺅ
36
ﺓ
35
ﻯ
34
ﺉ
33
ﺀ
32
ﺁ
31
ﺇ
30
ﺃ
29
2nd labeling attempt trial
1252269
c ≡ 1252269
7657117
(mod 14228119)
322813123
c ≡ 322813123
7657117
(mod 14228119)
ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ
c ≡ m
7657117
(mod 14228119)
ﻻ ﺷﻲﺀ
c ≡ m
7657117
(mod 14228119)
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This time, however, Yassin notices that he again has the problem of a disappearing digit 
resulting from the character  “ ﺍ ” for  the word “ ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ  ”.  This is due to the fact that 
Arabic is read right to left.  The “ ﺍ ” character remains, but one of its digits is lost during 
encryption.  Likewise, the loss of a zero digit occurs for the next eight padded characters.
4. Fourth labeling attempt.
To solve the problems of disappearing digits and equal digit length, Yassin starts 
by labeling the alphabet with the number 11.
ﻱ
28
ﻭ
27
ﻩ
26
ﻥ
25
ﻡ
24
ﻝ
23
ﻙ
22
ﻕ
21
ﻑ
20
ﻍ
19
ﻉ
18
ﻅ
17
ﻁ
16
ﺽ
15
ﺹ
14
ﺵ
13
ﺱ
12
ﺯ
11
ﺭ
10
ﺫ
09
ﺩ
08
ﺥ
07
ﺡ
06
ﺝ
05
ﺙ
04
ﺕ
03
ﺏ
02
ﺍ
01
ﺅ
36
ﺓ
35
ﻯ
34
ﺉ
33
ﺀ
32
ﺁ
31
ﺇ
30
ﺃ
29
3rd labeling attempt trial
0125022609
c ≡ _125022609
7657117
(mod 14228119)
3228130123
c ≡ 3228130123
7657117
(mod 14228119)
ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ
c ≡ m
7657117
(mod 14228119)
ﻻ ﺷﻲﺀ
c ≡ m
7657117
(mod 14228119)
ﻱ
38
ﻭ
37
ﻩ
36
ﻥ
35
ﻡ
34
ﻝ
33
ﻙ
32
ﻕ
31
ﻑ
30
ﻍ
29
ﻉ
28
ﻅ
27
ﻁ
26
ﺽ
25
ﺹ
24
ﺵ
23
ﺱ
22
ﺯ
21
ﺭ
20
ﺫ
19
ﺩ
18
ﺥ
17
ﺡ
16
ﺝ
15
ﺙ
14
ﺕ
13
ﺏ
12
ﺍ
11
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To simplify his calculations, Yassin groups three consecutive letters at a time from 
his original message m to form equal number blocks of length six.  He then uses the RSA 
encryption formula to encrypt each block separately.  This process is given by the revised 
RSA block encryption formula,
ci ≡ mi
e 
(mod n)
ci ≡ mi
7657117
(mod 14228119)
such that mi represents the numeric plaintext form of block i and ci represents the 
corresponding ciphertext.  The blocks are ordered from right to left.
Figure 28. RSA encryption.
ﻩ ﺇ ﻝ
2
334036
6500748
ﺍ ﺀ ﻑ
5
304211
13819400
ﺡ ﻝ ﺍ
8
113316
11202703
ﻥ ﺍ ﺏ
1
121135
1452031
ﻡ ﻱ ﻥ
4
353834
12083064
ﺹ ﺏ ﺍ
7
111224
2013713
ﺫ ﻩ ﺏ
0
123619
4793407
ﻯ ﺍ ﻝ
3
331144
12717422
ﻱ ﺍ ﻝ
6
331138
9854143
ﺵ ﻱ ﺀ
9
423823
2202791
plaintext
i
mi
ci
plaintext
i
mi
ci
plaintext
i
mi
ci
plaintext
i
mi
ci
ﺅ
46
ﺓ
45
ﻯ
44
ﺉ
43
ﺀ
42
ﺁ
41
ﺇ
40
ﺃ
39
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ciphertext:
Decryption (Trappe & Washington, 2006).
Yassin and Yusef send the ciphertext in an email to Ibrahim, whereby Ibrahim decodes 
each ciphertext block individually using his private key, (p, q, d) = (4789, 2971, 13), and 
the RSA block decryption formula,
mi ≡ ci
d 
(mod n)
mi ≡ ci
13
(mod 14228119)
The general RSA decryption formula without block notation is given by m ≡ c
d 
(mod n).
Ibrahim decrypts the first ciphertext block:
m0 ≡ c0
13
(mod 14228119)
m0 ≡ 4793407
13
(mod 14228119)
m0 ≡ 123619
The security of RSA rests in the fact that it is extremely difficult to factor large n.  
Consequently, it is hard to correctly determine the decryption exponent d from the 
formula de ≡ 1(mod (p - 1)(q - 1)), where (p - 1)(q - 1) = φ(n).
Applying cryptanalysis to the harbor.
We are given e = 7657117 and n = 14228119, since e and n were made public by 
Ibrahim.  Our goal is to factor n.  In order to do accomplish this task, we need two 
theorems and a definition.
6500748
13819400
11202703
1452031
12083064
2013713
4793407
12717422
9854143
2202791
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Theorem 1 (from Trappe and Washington (2006)).
Proof (Trappe & Washington, 2006).
Multiplying both sides of the inequality q < p by q we get, 
q
2
 < pq
Since n = pq, 
q
2
 < n
Now subtracting φ(n) from both sides of the equality n = pq we obtain,
             n - φ(n) = pq - φ(n) = pq - (p - 1)(q - 1) = pq - pq + q + p - 1 = q + p - 1          (1)
Since p < 2q we know that,
Suppose p, q are primes such that q < p < 2q.  Let n = pq and let 1 ≤ d, e < φ(n), whereby
 
φ(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) and de ≡ 1(mod φ(n)). If d <
calculation in time that is polynomial in log n.
n1/4, then d can be found by quick
This means, q <
                q + p - 1 < q + 2q - 1 < 3q < 3                                    (2)  
Now take ed = 1 + φ(n)k for some integer k ≥ 1, [there always exists an integer k ≥ 1  
for ed = 1 + φ(n)k since d is the inverse e modulo φ(n)], then φ(n)k < 1 + φ(n)k.
Since e < φ(n) and considering the original assumption that d <  n
1/4 
 we get,
φ(n)k < ed < φ(n)d < φ(n) n
1/4
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Definition: Continued fractions.
This shows that k < n
1/4
.  
Taking kn minus both sides of ed = 1 + φ(n)k and looking at both (1) and (2) in addition 
to the result that k < n
1/4 
we get,
kn - ed = kn - (1 + φ(n)k)
            = k(n - φ(n)) - 1 < k(n - φ(n)) < 3k < n
1/4
(3 ) = n
3/4             (3)
We know that n - φ(n) > 1, since n - φ(n) = q + p - 1 with p > 1 and q > 1.
Now, since k ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ d, e < φ(n) < n, we know 1 < k(n - φ(n)), then clearly,
0 < k(n - φ(n)) - 1 and 0 < kn - ed.  
Therefore, dividing 0 < kn - ed < n
3/4 
by dn in (3) and again considering the
original assumption that d < n
1/4
 we get,
The theorem states that if d <
time polynomial in log n.  This statement is explored further below.
n1/4, then d can be found by quick calculation in 
For every rational number,
there exists a unique finite continued fraction representation given by,
, such that p and q are positive integers,
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such that ai > 0 for i ≥ 1 and an > 1 [see Khinchin (1997) for restrictions on ai and 
uniqueness related to the last element an].  Here, the set of numbers {a0; a1, a2, . . . , an} 
are called the partial quotients of p/q (Weisstein, 2012).  In the case that p and q are 
positive integers, the partial quotients are always nonnegative integers.  We will now see
Set
then
where rn are called the remainders of x (Weisstein, 2012).
From the preceding recurrence relation we obtain,
how to obtain the finite continued fraction representation of .
Using the floor function, , define the finite continued fraction
representation of the rational number by the following recurrence relation,
 = r0
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Theorem 2 (from Trappe and Washington (2006)).  
Breaking RSA with continued fractions (from Trappe and Washington (2006)).
Therefore, we have
Given the finite continued fraction representation above, we can say 
where cn is called the nth convergent (Weisstein, 2012).
Following the recurrence relation above, it can be shown that the rational number 
pk/qk with the set of partial quotients {a0; a1, a2, . . . , ak} yields a closer 
approximation to p/q than the rational number pj/qj with partial quotients 
{a0; a1, a2, . . ., aj}, where 1≤ j < k. 
A rational number pi/qi such that 1≤ i ≤ n is called the ith convergent.
,  
It can also be shown that if , then a0 = 0.
For positive integers a, b, and the positive real number x if ,
then .
Looking at theorem 2, we can replace x by 
k and d, respectively.
.  We can also replace a and b by
91
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Looking at theorem 1 we know that,
                  
Then clearly from theorem 1,
By inserting the result found in theorem 1 into the conditional statement of theorem 2 we 
get,
This convergent is a direct result of the RSA algorithm’s implementation under the 
Theorem 1’s conditions.  Using this fact, we can follow five simple steps to factor n 
(from Trappe and Washington (2006)):
1.  Start by computing the finite continued fraction expansion of e/n.
2.  Calculate convergent p1/q1.
3.  Set k = p1 and d = q1 and compute h = (ed - 1)/k.  The value h is a possible value for 
φ(n) since ed = 1+ φ(n)k.
4.  If h is not a integer, stop, repeat steps 2 and 3 for convergent p2/q2, p3/q3, and so on.
5.  If h is an integer, find roots λ1, λ2 of the equation x
2 - (n - h +1)x + n = 0.  The 
equation x2 - (n - φ(n) +1)x + n = (x - p)(x - q).
If , then .
If , then .
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Remember, we have intercepted Ibrahim’s public key which is given by (n, e) = 
(14228119, 7657117).  Furthermore, Ibrahim does not need to protect this key from other 
people trying to steal/view it, since the security of RSA depends upon the private key and 
the fact that it is hard to factor large n.  We then follow steps 1 through 5 to factor n:
Step 1a.
Using the recurrence relation above we get,
Setting,
then
Proceeding in this manner, we obtain the partial quotients {0; 1, 1, 6, 19, 1, 433, 2, 62}.  
Therefore, the finite continued fraction expansion of e/n is given by,
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Step 2a.
Convergent p1/q1 is given by 1/1, so we set p1 = k = 1 and q1 = d = 1 and 
compute h = (ed - 1)/k.
h = (ed - 1)/k
h = (7657117 ⋅ 1 - 1)/1
h = 7657116
Step 3a.
Since h is an integer, we go to step 4.
Step 4a.
We must find roots λ1, λ2 of equation x
2 - (n - h +1)x + n where h = 7657116.
The equation with h = 7657116,
x2 - (14228119 - 7657116 +1)x + 14228119 = 0
x2 - (6571004)x + 14228119 = 0
gives roots λ1 = - sqrt(10794509163885) + 3285502 and  λ2 = sqrt(10794509163885) + 
3285502, which of course are not integers, so we proceed to the next convergent.
Step 2b.
Convergent p2/q2 is given by 1/2, so we set k = 1 and d = 2.  In fact, d cannot be equal to 
an even number, since an even number modulo another even number cannot give a 
remainder of 1.  [This statement comes directly from Ibrahim’s original 
equation 7657117d ≡ 1(mod 14220360)].
Step 2c.
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Convergent p3/q3 = 7/13, so set k = 7 and d = 13.  Computing h we get,
h = (ed - 1)/k
h = (7657117 ⋅ 13 - 1)/7
h = 14220360
Step 3c.
Since h is an integer, we proceed to step 4.
Step 4c.
Again, we must find roots λ1, λ2 of the equation x
2 - (n - h +1)x + n where h = 14220360.  
This time we get,
x2 - (14228119 - 14220360 +1)x + 14228119 = 0
x2 - (7760)x + 14228119 = 0
where λ1 = 4789 and λ2 = 2971.
We have therefore factored n.  We check that product of λ1 and λ2 is indeed equal to n.
n = (4789)(2971) = 14228119
We can now easily decode Yassin’s and Yusef’s cipher.
Part II Summary
For the sake of argument, if one removes the word “covert” from the term covert 
electronic networks, then perhaps one is just left with “regular” electronic networks.  If 
so, then it is reasonable to conclude that regular electronic networks form the sea of 
technology interaction which drives today’s modern world.  For example, the number of 
emails sent over the Internet everyday is enormous.  Now inserting the word covert back 
in, it is not hard to see why the total amount of information emanating from a covert 
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electronic network, would only contribute to a small fraction of all daily electronic 
information.  
If covert electronic networks are truly malicious and criminal on the terrorist 
level, then the scarcity of these networks, as well as their sometimes complex associated 
attributes, such as cryptography and steganography, does not bode well for law 
enforcement agencies.  To combat such networks requires a deep understanding of how 
individuals or organizations operate at the lowest level.  For instance, how they relay 
their data across different locations.  This also goes for learning how individuals and 
organizations use and adapt to today’s technology trends.  In this respect and with 
suggestion, law enforcement agencies must not only have the technical capacity to 
uncover such networks, but they must also have the correct foresight and creative edge to 
unlock the secrets of today’s covert electronic networks.
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Appendix A
Electronic Correspondence with J. Seberry (personal communication, May 8, 2011)
Dear Adam,
The data we gave in our book was incorrect. We tried to have this changed before 
publication but it  didn't happen.
There have been a few Saudi's interested in this but to my knowledge no better or newer 
data has been published. Of course it may have been published in Arabic (or Hebrew).
I do not know of anything related to specific dialects and extrapolating from English 
dialects I believe this could be a fruitful field of endeavour.
We originally looked extensively at Bahasa-Malaysia/Indonesia and Pin-yin
for Chinese but I don't have any more recent studies. We could distinguish between 
classically encrypted Nordic languages.
 
Good researching
 
Jennifer Seberry
Professor of Computer Science
Foundation Professor, Centre for Computer and Information Security Research,
School of Computer Science and Software Engineering
University of Wollongong
Wollongong
NSW 2522, Australia
